We had to wait for copies of Schelling�s Munich and Berlin lectures to be published until we learned about the decisive source of his theory of an �identiy of identity� or �identity doubled in itself�. Schelling referred to what he called an �older logic which was still acquainted with the figure of reduplication�, for instance Leibniz and Wolff. Philosophers in this tradition used this term in order to refer to the specification of  an aspect under which the subject-term is being considered. An often quoted example: �As consul, Fabius Maximus has authority over his father, but as son he stands under his father�s authority.� Schelling gave �reduplication� this turn: Nature as nature doesn�t coincide with the mind; and the mind as mind doesn�t coincide with nature. Both have different truth conditions, so as to �build-in� an essential moment of difference into the identity formula. There is an X, however, which is strictly (�seamlessly�) identical with itself (the absolute subject = X) while �transitively being� both of them in turn; and it is only via X that the relata (nature and mind) are indirectly identified to each other: �X ist B� and �X ist A� (and �X is strictly identical to itself�).

In addition to this Schelling held a view of predication as kind of identification he got familiarized with through his T�bingen-Seminary teacher Gottfried Ploucquet. Without this information we would never understand why Schelling could reasonably think that the identity-formula �A=A� is the genuine �matrix� of all veridical judgments. Take this together with his conviction that judging (Kant�s �relative position�) is a �minor� (or �inferior�) form of existential being (Kant�s �absolute position�) and you�ll understand why in 1806 in his Aphorisms Schelling could jot down this bold contention: �The strict sense of being (absolutely posited seamless self-sameness) is taken over by the loose sense of the copulative �is� which identfies subject and predicate; yes, this copula alone is existence itself and nothing else.�

Why should Schelling�s conception of nature-mind identity interest recent philosophers of mind? Because he presents an ontologically neutral solution: Identity is a symmetrical relation favouring neither mind nor matter and hindering that nature be �idealistically� reduced to the mind. We cannot conceive either of nature-mind identity as a fact inwardly disclosed to the mind (McGinn, Levine). Consciousness remains an enigma for itself; so does its identity with nature. We learn from Schelling that identity theories are justified not by self-evidence, but by an inference to the best explanation.

 In contrast to physical states, mental states, when occuring consciously, seem to have been �always already self-registered�. If there is little risk of disagreement on recognizing the phenomenon, philosophers widely disagree on the interpretation of the assumed registration mechanism. Most of them defend (or have defended) a higher-order view, widespread throughout the tradition of the modern �philosophy of the subject� up to our days. According to a ground-breaking publication by Dieter Henrich (1966), it was Fichte who first clearly diagnosed that and why what is henceforth called the �reflection model� fails due to vicious circularity and infinite regress. For how could one reflecting know that the reflected-on, in spite of its numerical difference, belongs to her herself, unless she had already been familiar with herself prior to the objectifying act of reflection (i.e., �pre-reflectively�)? The article attempts to show that this objection is still valid for some recently developed same-order (or self-representational) theories of self-awareness.