On May 3 2013, David Liggins (University of Manchester) will give a lecture ‘In defence of existence questions’ at VU University Amsterdam.

Location: VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, W&N Building, Room F-630
Time: 15.30-17.00

Abstract:
‘In defence of existence questions’
David Liggins, University of Manchester
(presenting joint work with Chris Daly, University of Manchester)

Do numbers exist? Do properties? Do possible worlds? Do fictional characters? Many metaphysicians spend time and effort trying to answer these and other questions about the existence of various entities. These inquiries have recently encountered opposition: a group of philosophers have argued that many or all of the existence questions debated by metaphysicians can be answered trivially, and so are not worth debating. Jonathan Schaffer argues that ‘contemporary existence debates are trivial, in that the entities in question obviously do exist’. Kit Fine argues that, whilst the debates about over concrete possible worlds may be non-trivial, this is an exceptional case: the existence questions debated by metaphysicians typically have trivial answers. Kathrin Koslicki suggests that metaphysicians’ existence questions can often be answered trivially: for example, the correct answer to ‘Do numbers exist?’ is ‘Yes, of course’. Koslicki claims that a ‘significant reorientation’ of analytic metaphysics is taking place: she associates Quine with the attempt to answer existence questions, and claims that metaphysicians are moving away from Quinean metaphysics and towards a neo-Aristotelian approach. The aim of the talk is to defend existence questions from these philosophers’ attacks.

Funded by the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council as part of the research project ‘The Foundations of Ontology’ and VU University Amsterdam.