The Significance of Phenomenology 

Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam

Netherlands Institute for Cultural Analysis 

Arianna Betti (ILLC, Amsterdam)

The Phenomenological Roots of Truthmaking  

15 January 2014, 4pm, C0.23, Oudemanhuispoort

Abstract

It is by now reasonably known that a truthmaker theory of truth is not the same as a correspondentist theory of truth. However, it is often left unclear what the difference between truthmaking and correspondence is, exactly. Furthermore, it is common to overlook an important distinction between variants of correspondentist theories, namely between what I propose to call parts-correspondence and whole-correspondence theories of truth. The differences between truthmaking and both variants of correspondentism, I claim, are of fundamental importance, both systematically and historically.

In this talk, I will first give an interpretive framework for the difference between variants of correspondentism and truthmaking in which systematic and historical aspect are inextricably connected. It will become clear that when due attention is paid to both the conceptual change from parts-correspondence to whole-correspondence theories of truth on the one side, and from whole-correspondence to truthmaking theories on the other side, a clear historical connection emerges between late 19^th century truth theories in early phenomenology and to early 20^th century truth theories in early analytic philosophy. The connection regards four interrelated elements: (a) the presence of whole-correspondence variants together with (b) specific convictions regarding mereological (part/whole) conceptualisations and (c) conceptualisations regarding the semantics of empty terms, leading to (d) the emergence of the notion of state of affairs (and, later, fact).

We find the constellation of these four elements (a, b, c, d) in the early phenomenology represented by Brentano and his pupils, in particular Twardowski and Meinong, and, I maintain, it is exactly this constellation that had a profound influence on early analytic philosophy.

I will round off the talk by arguing that these findings represent a novel account of the emergence of notion of fact in the history of philosophy that also has the benefit of being historically more accurate than any other explanation currently available.