UVA DEPT. OF PHILOSOPHY PRESENTS

2019 OZSW CONFERENCE

15TH & 16TH OF NOVEMBER

OZSW
Nederlandse Onderzoeksschool Wijsbegeerte

UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM
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Welcome

Dear philosophers, it’s wonderful to welcome you all in Amsterdam for a conference which promises many interesting and controversial debates! We (the department of Philosophy and especially the group of organizers) are very grateful that you contributed – and will contribute! – to these debates by submitting a paper and thus making for a very lively philosophical culture in the Netherlands. The range of topics is amazingly broad, expressing the diversity and depth of all of our philosophical endeavors. We all know that it’s especially relevant in this time, in this society, to demonstrate the relevance – the necessity – of philosophical discourses on all aspects of our lives and on all aspects of our history and our future. We hope that not only we, the participants, will learn a lot during the coming two days but that we will also be able to share our achievements with a broader public. This seems to us to be the best way of falsifying claims about the secondary role of philosophy and the humanities and to demonstrate that we're indispensable!

Thank you very much again – and I wish us all an exciting conference!

Prof. Dr. Beate Rössler, Chair of the Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam.

Dear fellow philosophers,

As the new director of the OZSW I am proud to welcome you to the 2019 edition of the yearly conference of our research school. The OZSW is home to well over 700 staff members and PhD candidates working in philosophy at all Dutch academic institutions.

The splendid programme that our Amsterdam colleagues have put together shows the richness of Dutch philosophical research.

I am looking forward to meeting you to discuss philosophy and to share new ideas for disseminating our insights to all stakeholders in Dutch society and beyond.

See you in Amsterdam!

Frans de Haas
Director OZSW
Organizing Committee

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Venues and Transportation

Venues

The main conference venues are
- Friday 15th of November: Doopsgezinde Kerk Singel 452, 1017 AW Amsterdam AND Universiteitsbibliotheek Singel 425, 1012 WP
- Saturday 16th of November: Oudemanhuispoort 4-6 1012 CN Amsterdam

The restaurants are
- Friday 15th of November: Sea Palace, Oosterdokskade 8, 1011 AE Amsterdam
- Saturday 16th of November: Kapitein Zeppos, Prayer Without End 5 1012 HS Amsterdam

Transportation

There are a variety of ways to get to the conference venues in the historical centre of Amsterdam.

From Schiphol Airport
Go to the train station in the arrival hall at Schiphol Airport. You can buy a ticket directly from the yellow NS machines, or you can buy an OV-chip card from the NS service point counter there (please note that you must first load credit onto the card before taking the train).
For more information on OV-chip cards, please visit the following link:

From Schiphol Airport, take the train to Amsterdam Central Station.

**From Amsterdam Central Station**
Take metro line 52 (Station Zuid) and get off at the first stop, called ‘Rokin’. From here you can walk to all conference venues (approx. 4 min.).

Some **tram lines** also stop at ‘Rokin’:

- Tram 4 towards Amstel Station
- Tram 14 towards Flevopark
- Tram 24 Towards VU Medisch Centrum

You can also **walk** from Amsterdam Central Station to the main conference venues (approx. 20 min./1.5 km).

- **Friday 15th of November - Doopsgezinde Kerk Singel 452, 1017 AW Amsterdam**
  Exit Amsterdam Central Station through the main entrance (towards the city center) and follow Damrak. Cross Dam square to continue your way onto Rokin. Upon reaching the water, take a right onto the Spui. When reaching the next gracht, take a left and cross via the bridge towards the Koningsplein. After crossing, immediately take a right and follow Singel, the Doopsgezinde Kerk will be on your left.

- **Saturday 16th of November - Oudemanhuispoort 4-6 1012 CN Amsterdam**
  When exiting the station through the main entrance (towards the city center), take a left and cross the Kamperbrug on your right. Follow the Gelderskade, cross Nieuwmarkt square and keep straight on Kloveniersburgwal. The entrance to *Oudemanhuispoort* will be on your right past the second bridge indicated by an archway.

**Taxis**
It is possible to get around Amsterdam by taxi, which can be ordered by phone/app or found at taxi ranks near major stations and large hotels in the city. Take note that Amsterdam taxis are expensive, particularly if you are travelling to/from Schiphol Airport.

**Cycling**
Amsterdam is very-well equipped to accommodate cyclists. Amsterdam Central Station, Leidseplein and Dam Square are major rental hubs, with day rates averaging € 10. If you are in possession of a personal OV-chip card, you can also rent a NS bike at an advantageous rate.
**Timetable**

**Day 1 - Friday 15th November, 2019**  
**Location:** Doopsgezinde Kerk, Universiteitsbibliotheek

10.00-10.45: Coffee/Tea & Registration; Doopsgezinde Kerk  
10.45-11.00: Opening and Welcome; Doopsgezinde Kerk  
11.00-12.00: Keynote Lecture 1: Anne Phillips (LSE): "Unconditional Equality"; Kerkzaal, Doopsgezinde Kerk  
12.00-13.00: Lunch & Poster Sessions; Doopsgezinde Kerk  
13.00-14.30:  
  - **Doopsgezinde Kerk:** Panels 1-2, Symposium 1  
  - **Universiteitsbibliotheek:** Panels 3-5, Symposium 2  
14.30-16.00:  
  - **Doopsgezinde Kerk:** Panels 6-7, Symposium 3  
  - **Universiteitsbibliotheek:** Panels 8-10, Symposium 4  
16.00-16.30: Coffee/Tea; Doopsgezinde Kerk, Universiteitsbibliotheek  
16.30-18.00:  
  - **Doopsgezinde Kerk:** Panels 11-12, Symposium 5  
  - **Universiteitsbibliotheek:** Panels 13-15, Symposium 6  
18.00-19.00: Keynote Lecture 2: Ruth Sonderegger (Academy of Fine Arts Vienna):  
  "The emergence of philosophical aesthetics and its colonial entanglements"; Kerkzaal, Doopsgezinde Kerk  
19.30-21.30: Conference Dinner at Sea Palace Restaurant (http://seapalace.nl)

**Day 2 - Saturday 16th November, 2019**  
**Location:** Oudemanhuispoort

9.00-9.30: Coffee/Tea; Oudemanhuispoort  
9.30-10.30: Keynote Lecture 3: Barbara Vetter (FU Berlin): "What do we talk about when we talk about metaphysical modality?"; D1.09 Oudemanhuispoort  
10.30-12.00: Panels 16-20, Symposium 7  
12.00-13.00: Lunch  
  - Lunch meeting: Chamber Theoretical Philosophy; C0.23  
  - Lunch meeting: Chamber Practical Philosophy; C1.17  
  - Lunch Meeting: Chamber History of Philosophy; C1.23  
13.00-14.00: Public Panel Discussion; D0.08  
14.00-15.30: Panels 21-25, Symposiums 8-9  
15.30-16.00: Coffee/Tea  
16.00-17.30: Panels 26-30, PhD Council: Penal Discussion (C2.17)  
17.30-18.30: Keynote Lecture 4: Pauline Kleingeld (RUG): "Kant’s Republican Conception of the Freedom of the Will"; D1.09  
18.30-19.30: Borrel/Drinks at Kapitein Zeppos
Keynote Speakers

Keynote 1: Anne Phillips (LSE): “Unconditional Equality”, Kerkzaal, Doopsgezinde Kerk

Anne Phillips is a Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics. She specializes in feminist theory and addresses issues of democracy and representation. She has written numerous books, most recently *The Politics of the Human* (2015).

Keynote 2: Ruth Sonderegger (Academy of Fine Arts Vienna): “The emergence of philosophical aesthetics and its colonial entanglements”, Kerkzaal, Doopsgezinde Kerk

Ruth Sonderegger is Professor of Philosophy and Aesthetic Theory at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna. She specializes in aesthetics and art theory, cultural studies, political philosophy, critical theory and resistance studies. Most recently, she co-authored the book *Foucaults Gegenwart. Sexualität - Sorge - Revolution* (2016).
Keynote 3: Barbara Vetter (FU Berlin): “What do we talk about when we talk about metaphysical modality?”, D1.09

Barbara Vetter is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the Free University in Berlin. She specializes in metaphysics, philosophy of language and epistemology. She published Potentiality. From Dispositions to Modality (2015).

Keynote 4: Pauline Kleingeld (Groningen): “Kant's Republican Conception of Freedom of the Will”, D1.09

Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Ethics and its History at the University of Groningen. She specializes in Kantian ethics and political philosophy, discussing issues concerning free will and moral agency. She published the book Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship (2012).
Program Symposia

Day 1: Friday, November 15th

Symposium 1: Computational approaches to (the history of) philosophy
13.00-14.30 Kerkzaal, Doopsgezinde Kerk
Annapaola Ginammi, Arianna Betti, Thijs Ossenkoppele and Sander Verhaegh
Abstract: This symposium concerns methodological reflection on computational approaches to the study of (the history of) philosophy. The goal is to discuss some state-of-the-art applications of computational methods in (historical) philosophical research and focus on their methodology. The main question of this symposium will be: What are the conditions under which computational methods can be used in philosophical research in a methodologically sound way? Additionally, it will discuss which obstacles are to be overcome for a successful use of computer methods in the research in (the history of) philosophy.

Symposium 2: Philosophical reflections on Research Integrity
13.00-14.30 Doelenzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek
André Krom, Mariëtte van den Hoven, Jos Kole, René van Woudenberg and Tamarinde Haven
Abstract: This symposium brings together philosophical reflections on key topics related to research integrity, showing how these reflections contribute to promoting good science and good scientists. Specifically, we will address: (1) What explains scientific misconduct, and how different explanations of this phenomenon are connected; (2) How different views on science can help decide whether a researcher who generated data but left the project prematurely still deserves (co-)authorship of the publication that is based on the data; (3) What conceptual framework is required to support a view on Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR), according to which RCR covers dealing with moral dilemmas; and (4) What image(s) of research integrity we should embrace to help researchers become confident about doing the right thing and which challenge(s) them to empower themselves to learn to deal with issues of integrity.

Symposium 3: Global and Comparative Perspectives on Canons in Philosophy
14.30-16.00 Kerkzaal, Doopsgezinde Kerk
Lucas den Boer, Ady Van den Stock, Karl-Stéphan Bouthillette and Yolande Jansen
Abstract: This panel wants to investigate how philosophical traditions at different times and in different cultures have dealt with their own canons. How have European philosophers dealt with non-European sources in the past? What are the underlying ideas that determined the shape of canons in, for example, the Indian, Chinese, and African traditions? Were these traditions willing to incorporate texts from different traditions? What were the reasons for change? And how do contemporary philosophical canons relate to debates on decolonial philosophy?

By looking at the process of canon formation in a global and comparative perspective, this panel aims to get a better understanding of the ideas that constitute philosophical canons. For this purpose, this panel will bring together several scholars with expertise of philosophy in different cultural and historical contexts.
Symposium 4: Higher Cognition without Representation: a Showcase
14.30-16.00 Doelenzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek
Daan Dronkers, Zuzanna Rucińska and Jasper van den Herik
Abstract: Many people in the cognitive sciences and in philosophy of cognition hold that cognition is Embodied, Embedded, Extended, Enactive, Ecological and/or Enculturated. However, present discussions of E-cognition are restricted to ‘lower’ forms of cognition and/or are stuck in the dominant paradigm of cognitive science, which places mental representations at the centre of cognitive activity. In this symposium, we will showcase a radical approach to E-cognition that goes beyond these two limitations. We have gathered three researchers who will show that we can account for ‘higher’ forms of cognition without mental representations. In three short presentations, we will introduce non-representational perspectives on language, mathematics and pretense. These perspectives challenge the dominant representationalism in regards to explanatory power, ontological costs, and naturalist credentials, and are especially well-suited to account for the social and material aspects of cognition. After showcasing our radical E-accounts, we open the floor for a plenary discussion.

16.30-18.00 Kerkzaal, Dopsgezinde Kerk
Roel Veraart, Ole Thijs and Boris van Meurs
Abstract: In this symposium we ask after the status of the ‘Earth System’, focussing on the discrepancy between the passive, material ‘thing’ called Earth and the acting, cognitive agents within it; are these agents encompassed by the system, are they rationally distinct from it, or both? Accordingly, we discuss similar conceptual problems related to the themes of Earth, nature and humankind, by zooming in on the case of the Bio-based Economy and showing how general concepts such as economy and ecology are in need of fundamental improvement. Finally, we return to the notion of the Anthropocene as a geological epoch, and investigate the new relation to time that this entails; humanity has already altered the course of the Earth System for at least thousands of years to come, and the scale of ‘deep time’ with which we are thus involved casts new questions of human action and responsibility.

Symposium 6: Philosophy & Psychiatry
16.30-18.00 Doelenzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek
Matthé Scholten, Linde Van Schuppen and Roy Dings
Abstract: Philosophy of psychiatry is a relatively new and growing field of research related to philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, phenomenology and ethics. It investigates a wide array of issues surrounding the foundations of psychiatry as a science, the definition of a mental disorder, concepts used to describe mental disorders, explanations of psychopathology and symptoms, and ethics of mental health law and clinical practice. The field is highly interdisciplinary, using methods from the humanities, the social sciences and the health sciences and integrating conceptual and ethical analysis, qualitative and quantitative research methods.
This symposium focuses on three different aspects of the philosophy of psychiatry: personal identity, language and ethics. Roy Dings will reflect on problems of self- understanding and
narrative identity after receiving a psychiatric diagnosis. Linde van Schuppen will explore the notions of viewpoint and perspective as a potential explanation of aberrant use of language and formal thought disorder in persons with schizophrenia. Matthé Scholten will develop an ethical critique of current mental health law policy and psychiatric practice in relation to involuntary commitment of persons with mental disorders. The speakers will highlight both the philosophical implications of their analyses and their impact on policy and practice.

Day 2: Saturday, November 16th

Symposium 7: Social Epistemology Put to Work
10.30-12.00 C0.17, Oudemanhuispoort

Jeroen de Ridder, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Emily Sullivan and Boudewijn de Bruin

Abstract: The first goal of this symposium is to showcase the recent trend towards applied social epistemology. It features four contributions by philosophers who work in research projects in the Netherlands that are at the forefront of this trend. Topics include: the importance of trust in large societal debates, the epistemic dimensions of corporate culture, the epistemic responsibilities we incur when sharing information online, and the ways in which the online world can make us believe that we know and understand much more than we in fact do.

The second goal is agenda-setting for future work in applied social epistemology. In the Q&A and panel discussion, the contributors and audience will together explore emerging topics and questions that can lay the basis for novel research projects and collaborations.

Symposium 8: Values and technology: A reciprocal relationship
14.00-15.30 C0.17, Oudemanhuispoort

Matthew Dennis, Martin Sand, Anna Melnyk, Tom Coggins, Olya Kudina and Ibo van de Poel

Abstract: Some philosophers of technology have proposed embedding values in the design of emerging technologies. Such a drive for value sensitive design is due to the recognition that there is a correlation between the designs of our technological infrastructures and their effects on human convictions and behaviour. Without accepting a straightforward technological determinism, proponents of value sensitive design are motivated by the idea that technological systems provide digital and analogue infrastructures that vastly impact on how people conduct themselves and what they believe. Nevertheless, research on digital online technologies shows that designers could do more to incorporate pro-social values in their products. The contributors of this panel share the belief that these challenges can be tackled by applying value sensitive design to emerging technology in the online space, while proposing different ways this idea can be best applied.

Note: 4 presentations (comprising 2 x joint presentations, and 2 single-author presentations).

Symposium 9: The meaning of generics
14.00-15.30 C1.17, Oudemanhuispoort

Olivier Lemeire, Robert Van Rooij, Katrin Schulz and Albert Oosterhof

Abstract: Generics are generalizations that are not explicitly quantified, like “Dogs bark” and “Birds lay eggs”. These generalizations characterize (the members of) a kind without
specifying how many members of the kind instantiate the predicated property. Recent years have seen an ever increasing interest for these generalizations among philosophers and linguists. For although they are ubiquitous in our philosophical, scientific and everyday language use, the meaning of these generalizations remains puzzling. During this symposium, we aim to present new answers to this challenging puzzle and bring together several philosophers and linguists working on these same issues.
Program Panel Sessions

Day 1: Friday, November 15th

Panel 1: Rights and Duties
13.00-14.30 Kerkenraadskamer, Doopsgezinde Kerk

Ali Emre Benli
Political rights of asylum seekers and refugees in the EU

Abstract: Asylum seekers and refugees in the European Union (EU) lack any formal standing to participate in the decision-making mechanisms of the EU. They are devoid of political rights of representation such as the right to vote and stand in elections, and their freedoms of expression, assembly and association are limited by security and stability concerns of the host states. In this article, I argue for granting asylum seekers and refugees a limited set of political rights that would enable them to be represented in the decision-making mechanisms of the EU without the need for them to be naturalized in a member state. In order to make my case, I explore two kinds of moral grounds: one from human rights and another from democratic theory.

Marijn Nohlmans
A Political Concept of Republican Liberty

Abstract: This paper proposes a vision of distinctly political republican liberty, which can be formulated like this: “A person is free if, and only if, he is a citizen of a free republic”. Thinking of liberty this way has several substantial advantages. Namely, (1) it is, unlike the neo-republicanism of Pettit, truly distinct from (pure) negative liberty; (2) it awards liberty the essential political quality that has arguably been missing within neo-republicanism; and, lastly, (3) it views liberty as a status that can be enjoyed by citizens of the democratic and lawful republic rather than being oriented around (free) actions.

Kritika Maheshwari
Risk and the Duty not to Harm

Abstract: If we have a pro tanto duty not to harm, then does it also proscribe actions that merely raise the probability of harm? One answer is that because risking harm is an instance of harming, actions that impose risk fall squarely within the scope of the duty not to harm. I discuss four arguments in favour of this position and argue that risk is not a harm in itself. I conclude that there is at least one reason why the duty does not cover cases of risking harm.

Panel 2: Epistemology
13.00-14.30 Seminarie, Doopsgezinde Kerk

Peter Hawke
Are Gettier Cases Disturbing?

Abstract: We contrast prominent naturalistic lines on the method of cases (MoC), exemplified by Williamson (2007) and Machery (2017). Both analyze MoC as fallibilist and non-exceptionalist, accommodating moderate modal skepticism. But Gettier cases are in
dispute. Williamson claims they induce knowledge. Machery claims MoC should be abandoned entirely. Naturalists should side with Williamson: data accrued by experimental philosophers does not impugn the reliability of Gettier reasoning; Gettier cases need not exhibit ‘disturbing characteristics’ that explain why MoC sometimes induces dubious judgments; and extant naturalistic accounts of Gettier-reasoning permit its cogency. Thus, disciplined thought experiments produce naturalistically explicable and philosophically substantive knowledge.

Job de Grefte
Knowledge as Justified True Belief
Abstract: In this paper, I defend the claim that knowledge is justified true belief. This claim is familiar but rejected by most epistemologists, largely due to Gettier’s famous counterexamples. My argument is indirect; I argue that Gettier does not, in fact, give us reason to reject the tripartite analysis. Rather, I argue that justification requires the absence of veritic luck, and that since Gettier cases necessarily involve veritic luck, these are not cases of justification and thus not counterexamples to the tripartite account. I consider objections to this anti-luck account of justification, as well as some implications.

Victor Gijsbers
The Paradox of Predictability
Abstract: Scriven’s paradox of predictability arises from the idea that everything in a deterministic universe is predictable; and that it is nevertheless possible to create a system that falsifies any prediction that is made of it. Recently, the paradox has been used by Rummens and Cuypers to argue that there is a fundamental difference between embedded and external predictors; and by Ismael to argue against a governing conception of laws. The present paper defends a new diagnosis of the paradox. First, it argues that unpredictability has to be understood in the light of Turing’s famous results about computability, in particular his proof that there is no solution to the ‘halting problem’. Second, the sense of paradox that nevertheless remains is traced to the idea that rational behaviour is not dependent on contingent environmental circumstances: that it is always up to us to engage in activities such as rational prediction or rational belief.

Panel 3: Scientific and Academic Practices
13.00-14.30 Potgieterzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek

Jan G. Michel
Being Creative in Science. The Role of Imagination and Fiction in Scientific Discovery Processes
Abstract: By focusing on scientific discoveries as a key aspect of science, the purpose of this paper is to argue that imagination and fiction play a crucial role in science. In a first step, the author argues that imagination and fiction within scientific discovery processes are part of a creative process which is situated within the overall structure of scientific discovery processes subsequent to the initial finding which, in turn, is indispensable to any discovery process. In a second step, the author gives an analysis of how this creative process can be characterized.
Jan Peter Bergen
Technology, Agency and Interaction: following dance metaphors to where they lead
Abstract: The question of technological agency in human-technology interactions has been a much-discussed topic in posthuman theories on technology. Despite this, current conceptualizations such as those of Latour and Verbeek do not do justice to the experience of technologies as active others in alterity relations with them. Specifically, the metaphor of hybridity is not up to the task of adequately describing such relations. In this paper, I explore an alternative that focuses more on the performativity of human-technology interactions rather than on metaphysical or ontological ascriptions of agency: Pickering’s ‘dance of agency’. I push this metaphor further by specifically reflecting on leading and following in couple dancing, and how this describes an asymmetrical but interactive relationship between human and technological ‘dance partners’ that retains the alterity of technological quasi-others.

Amanda Cawston
Academic Anonymity
Abstract: Anonymity is an important tool for academics, particularly for feminist academics (e.g. as a structural protection against biased review). Anonymously publishing work could also provide further benefits - avoiding competition, harmful hierarchies, and self-commodification. However, anonymity could hamper as well: 1) monitoring representation, 2) promotion of women’s contributions, and 3) mask the situatedness of ideas and the shared nature of thought. I argue that the first objection describes a solvable practical problem, and that the second reflects contestable notions concerning feminist aims. I argue that the risk described in the third objection may be mitigated by pursuing certain changes in the structure of publishing.

Panel 4: Virtue
13.00-14.30 Vondelzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek

J.C.M. Duetz
Virtue Epistemology in legal practice: How a theory of meaning helps us understand epistemic justice
Abstract: Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning as use proffers useful tools to better understand the epistemic challenges for legal systems that value the objectivity and uniformity of their jurisdiction. The biggest challenge for such legal systems is posed by legal uncertainty (which describes a legal system in which verdicts are not fixed by legislation alone, but also (for example) by ‘unlawful’ considerations of judges). I develop a Wittgensteinian solution which enables us to avoid legal uncertainty and consider three possibilities to deal with its (partial) cause: the influence of social/cultural value systems on the meaning of words in utterances.

Mandi Astola
The virtue of co-creative justice
Abstract: In recent years, many innovating institutions have turned to co-creation. Co-creation is an involvement of various parties in the innovation of a product, who usually have some stake in the product. Co-creation is distinct from other innovation contexts and
therefore deserves its own ethical analysis. Literature from design studies and interviews with co-creation practitioners shows that open-mindedness and receptiveness to the perspectives of others is deemed crucial for a successful co-creation. The behaviors of the goal-directed listening and the treatment of participants as merely test subjects are also identified as examples of conduct that lead to unsuccessful co-creation. This paper reframes these insights in terms of Miranda Fricker's notion of testimonial justice.

**Panel 5: Problems of Tradition and Heritage**
13.00-14.30 Belle van Zuylenzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek

**William Bülow**

*On risking lives to avoid harm to cultural heritage in war*

**Abstract:** This paper examines the conditions under which combatants are morally permitted to impose non-negligible risks of serious harm on innocent civilians in order to avoid causing harm to tangible cultural heritage during armed conflict. In contrast to previous contributions on this topic, I argue that combatants are rarely permitted to impose such risks. Instead, I argue that such risk impositions cannot be justified by either a lesser-evil justification or by appealing to the fact that at least some civilians might consent to such risks.

**Corrado Claverini**

*What is Italian Thought? Reflections on the Role of Philosophy in Contemporary Society*

**Abstract:** In the last few years, an old question seems to have returned to the forefront of philosophy: is it improper to speak about national philosophical traditions? Or is it legitimate, for example, to identify a precise Italian philosophy and distinguish it from a French one? If it is the case that it is legitimate, is it also beneficial to speak in such terms? What are the risks and advantages of using national or territorial criteria as a principle for identifying different traditions of philosophical thought?

**Matthias Kramm**

*Five Arguments from Tradition*

**Abstract:** In this paper, I outline a method for analysing arguments from tradition. In the first step, I disentangle arguments from tradition from other claims regarding religion, identity, and culture. In the second step, I identify which type of argument from tradition is being made: Is the argument based on an understanding of tradition as authority, tradition as evolution, tradition as a test of time, tradition as a learning process, or tradition as moral enquiry? In the third step, I determine to what extent this argument from tradition is sound and can provide justification for the claim that something is good or right.

**Panel 6: Ethics: Choice and Responsibility**
14.30-16.00 Kerkenraadskamer, Doopsgezinde Kerk

**Shervin Mirzaeighazi**

*On the Parfitian Thesis of Moral Responsibility*

**Abstract:** There seems to be a tension between determinism and moral responsibility such that, if determinism is true then perhaps we cannot be responsible for our actions. In his *On What Matters*, Derek Parfit tried to find a way to dissolve this tension through discussing a
Kantian argument about the noumenal world. In recent years Parfit’s argument has received some criticism, which has sought to undermine his argument while also making a variety of different claims about his actual views on this issue. In this paper, I argue that Parfit’s argument requires modification. My proposals not only promise to make his argument clearer, but can also be used to answer some of his critics.

**Patrick Smith**

*An Institutionalist Solution to the Responsibility Problem in Emerging Security Technologies*

**Abstract:** A serious objection to relying upon autonomous security systems—from cybersecurity to autonomous vehicles and weapon systems—is that such reliance will generate ‘responsibility gaps.’ Since autonomous systems are likely to intersect with chaotic contexts to make unpredictable decisions for opaque reasons, it is unclear who we should hold responsible for harms or rights violations when the system fails. Rather than develop more and more elaborate accounts of personal responsibility that attempt to unravel thorny questions about the moral and causal contribution, this paper puts forth an institutional theory of distributed responsibility. Individual obligations to take particular steps to avoid moral failures are distributed by the relevant institutions on the basis of fair principles that take the interests of their constituents into account. I suggest a ‘quasi-Rawlsian’ solution where we conceive of the relationship between the defense-industrial complex and the civilians they purport to protect as a single cooperative system.

**Akshath Jitendranath.**

*Hard Choices: Neither Parity, Nor Incommensurability, Nor Incomparability*

**Abstract:** I shall take the phenomena of hard choices as my point of departure, and my objective here is to present a systematic critique of the contemporary philosophical discussion of these situations. It will be argued that: (i) hard choices are not cases where the alternatives are on a par with each other as Ruth Chang has influentially claimed; (ii) neither are they situations where the alternatives instantiate incommensurable values as, alas, too many philosophers tacitly believe; and further, (iii) despite being widely held and fairly plausible, the belief that hard choices are situations where some pair of alternatives are incomparable or unranked is not convincing.

**Panel 7: Modality: Dispositions and Imagination**

14.30-16.00 Seminarie, Doopsgezinde Kerk

**Nathan Wildman**

*Potential Problems?*

**Abstract:** In this paper, I critique Vetter’s (2015) potentialist account of modality. Specifically, I show that her picture entails the truth of contradictory modal claims. To do so, I begin (§1) by quickly sketching Vetter’s conception of potentialities, including five key points concerning the interplay between degrees of potentiality and time. I then demonstrate (§2) how these jointly entail the truth of contradictory modal claims. Finally, I conclude (§3) by anticipating and rejecting some possible responses to this argument.

**Tom Schoonen**

*A Note on the Epistemological Value of Pretense-Imagination*

**Abstract:** In this paper, I will evaluate the claim that imagination as simulation provides us
with justification (or, is epistemically useful). In particular, I will argue that it is crucial to evaluate which cognitive faculties are ‘simulated’ in order for imagination to actually be epistemically useful. I argue that imagination, understood as simulation of rational belief revision, cannot provide us with justification by providing a formal model of it. I will suggest that a better option is imagination as sensori-motor simulation.

Samuel Taylor
*Mental Representations as Instruments*

**Abstract:** Representationalists and anti-representationalists remain at loggerheads about whether or not we should be committed to mental representations. Here, I argue that we cannot empirically decide between representationalism and anti-representationalism, because we have not yet reached an agreement about what constitutes a genuine explanation in cognitive science. To make progress, I defend the view that our (defeasible) commitment to representations should be a function of, on the one hand, their utility in cognitive science, and, on the other hand, our capacity to make sense of (the effects of) representations in terms of things (and effects) with which we are experientially acquainted.

*Panel 8: Philosophy of Science*

14.30-16.00 Potgieterzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek

Sam Rijken
*Two Types of Thought Experiments*

**Abstract:** In this paper I argue that we can and should strongly distinguish between two types of thought experiments (TEs) in science: roughly, those heuristic TEs that occur during scientific discovery on the one hand, and those that are used during scientific communication and debate, on the other. I argue that the conflation of these two types of TEs is limiting progress in the philosophy of TEs, and I demonstrate how my distinction enables us to find new answers to the usual problems surrounding TEs---eg. the Kuhnian paradox and the problem of demonstrative force.

Stefaan Blancke
*Science and the epidemiology of reasons*

**Abstract:** Science is constituted by and results from the interactions of individuals with others as well as with their environment. But how do these interactions result in scientific knowledge? We suggest that scientific representations spread through chains of social transmission. Reasons play an important part in the formation and distribution of scientific representations. Scientists constantly propose and discuss reasons. From these small-scale communicative interactions we see that certain types of reasons become successful within scientific communities. A naturalistic understanding of the development of science thus requires an epidemiology of reasons: the study of how reasons spread, transform and stabilize.

Noelia Iranzo Ribera
*Interventions in the spotlight: delimiting possibility in Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation*

**Abstract:** Interventions are the crucial notion of interventionist theories of causation. In this
paper, I argue that James Woodward’s account of interventions is either defective or not sufficiently informative. Section 1 is an introduction to his two-staged (IV)-(IN) formal definition of intervention. Section 2 investigates the space of possibilities (SP) the notion of intervention delimits. Section 3 assesses SP in connection with variable choice in interventionist causal models. I argue that 1) his move from physical to conceptual possibility is not well-motivated and that 2) his account cannot causally explain cases of disputed ontology or those that exhibit certain kinds of inseparability of properties.

**Panel 9: Mental Causation and Incompatibilism**
14.30-16.00 Vondelzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek

**Ruben Noorloos**
*Spinoza’s Apparent Denial of Mental Causation*

**Abstract:** Because Spinoza denies interactionism, it is usually thought that he must deny (mind-body or body-mind) mental causation as well. This is a mistake. Within the context of his psychological theory, the extensionalist notion of causation used in the mental causation debate poses no problems for Spinoza’s system. His position on mental causation is as strong as that of the traditional identity theorist.

**Takashi Oki**
*Aristotle’s Incompatibilism*

**Abstract:** The problem of compatibility/incompatibility between the possibility of a meaningful deliberation and necessitarianism has long been a topic of discussion, and it is well known that Aristotle is concerned with the problem in De Interpretatione 9. Aristotle thinks that if everything happens of necessity (18b30-31), then ‘there would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, thinking that if we do this, this will happen, but if we do not, it will not’ (18b31-33). In this paper, I argue that Aristotle is a deliberation incompatibilist, and consider why he thinks that it is reasonable to endorse this position.

**Panel 10: Cognition and Action**
14.30-16.00 Belle van Zuylenzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek

**Jeff White and Bas de Boer**
*A Garden too Perfect? The Neglect of Cognition in the Landscape of Ecological Enactivism*

**Abstract:** Ecological enactivism (EE) explains cognition in terms of the skillful engagement of organisms with their environment. On this account, cognition aims at routine action informed by environmental regularities. We argue that EE neglects two important aspects of cognition: that (1) many aspects of “higher” cognition arise due to a lack of harmony between humans and the environment, and (2) cognitive agents have the potential to form themselves. We propose a solution to these problems. First, we clarify the dynamics of higher cognition that are otherwise occluded in EE. Second, we propose a phenomenological account of self explaining the capability of change.

**Hans Tromp**
*Davidson’s Unitary Action Theory grounded on Action Cognition*

**Abstract:** In ‘Problems in explaining Actions’, his last essay on action, Donald Davidson deviated from his earlier work and declared intention, with its components belief and desire
to be the cause of action. He suggested that ongoing work such as Dretske’s could lead to a unitary system explaining both the physical and the mental aspects of actions. The purpose of this contribution is to show how, about 30 years later, a functional Grounded Action Cognition model matches Dretske’s analysis and contributes to Davidson’s suggestion of a unitary system to understand intentional actions by providing the links between the mental action preparation and the physical execution of intentional actions.

Carlo Ierna
Brentano, HERMES, and the "extended" mind

Abstract: Clark and Chalmers’ Extended Mind Thesis claims that elements in our environment, beyond the skull, do not just deserve epistemic credit, but can be considered as a part of our mind. I will argue that their distinction between internal and external elements is not sharp but gradual, raising questions about the notion of “extending” the mind. I will look both backwards and forwards in time for support, to Franz Brentano’s conception of proper vs symbolic presentations and to the future technologies of the HERMES project.

Panel 11: Basic Concepts in Ethics
16.30-18.00h: Kerkenraadskamer, Doopsgezinde kerk

Katharina Bauer
Human dignity in bioethical debates. In defense of a contentious concept

Abstract: I will defend the use of the concept of dignity in bioethical debates against accusations of vacuousness, complete opacity, or uselessness. This implies that I have to defend it against using it in a vague and philosophically dishonest manner. Based on an analysis of different understandings of human dignity, I will argue that this concept serves the purpose of bundling different claims for respect towards the potential perfection of properties that make us human beings as well as towards the diversity, givenness, and uniqueness of imperfect human beings. Finding the right balance between these claims is particularly important in current bioethical debates.

Huub Brouwer
When, If Ever, Is Desert Forward-Looking?

Abstract: Can you deserve on the basis of things you will be and/or do in future? Fred Feldman (1995) argues that, sometimes, you can. Many philosophers have resisted Feldman’s argument, and claimed that desert really is backward-looking. A few other philosophers have built on Feldman’s suggestion that desert may sometimes be forward-looking, and proposed a more elaborate account of forward-looking desert. In this paper, I defend Feldman’s argument for forward-looking desert against the criticisms that have been raised against it, and argue that desert is forward-looking for a wider range of objects and bases than has been considered so far.

Panel 12: Logic and Language
16.30-18.00h: Seminarie, Doopsgezinde kerk

Peter van Ormondt
Modified Numerals as split Disjunctions
**Abstract:** We present a formal framework from which we can rigorously derive facts about ignorance effects of superlative modified numerals and the obviations of these effects when embedded under quantifiers by analyzing modified numerals as split disjunctions. The framework is a modal predicate logic with state-based semantics. Contrary to previous literature we will adopt a split notion of disjunction from team logic.

**Thom van Gessel**

_A Priori and Necessary Questions_

**Abstract:** Since Kripke, philosophers have distinguished a priori true statements from necessarily true ones. This distinction can be captured formally by using two-dimensional semantics. However, these notions can apply to questions as well: intuitively, ‘Am I here now?’ is a priori and contingent, while ‘Who am I?’ is a posteriori and necessary. To capture this, two-dimensional semantics can be combined with a semantics for questions. In this paper, we combine two-dimensional semantics with inquisitive semantics in order to formulate definitions of a priority and necessity that apply to questions and statements uniformly.

**Thomas Brouwer**

_Characterising Dialetheic Falsity_

**Abstract:** Dialetheism is the view that there can be true contradictions. I explore a little-discussed challenge for dialetheism: characterising the property of falsity. Because the behaviours of truth and falsity are not as closely intertwined in the logics that dialetheists employ as they are in classical logic, an account of falsity does not drop out of the account of truth. I argue that it is difficult to give a dialetheic account of falsity which suffices to explain why dialetheists should care about distinguishing between what is false and what is not. However, without such an account, the case for dialetheism is undermined.

**Panel 13: Problems of Reliability/Evidence**

16.30-18.00h: Potgieterzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek

**Guido Tana**

_A Taxonomy of Skepticism: On the Relationship between Closure and Underdetermination Skepticism_

**Abstract:** This paper has the aim of analyzing the relationship between the two principles contemporary epistemology considers as the sources of philosophical doubt: Closure [CP] and Underdetermination (Pritchard 2015). The debate taken into account will be the one arisen from Brueckner 1994 and Cohen 1998, objecting to the latter's interpretation of Closure as the more fundamental skeptical doubt. It will be argued that, although the two kinds of arguments are not equivalent, CP skepticism parasitizes UP. The motivation for Underdetermination Skepticism is then diagnosed, highlighting how UP differs from standard external world doubt as in the case of Closure Skepticism. Underdetermination establishes a normative kind of skepticism about the possibility of experience and evidence being in rational relation to our beliefs. Ultimately it is concluded that the two establish different, albeit related, varieties of skepticism, with Closure skepticism being a special case of Underdetermination’s more general worry.
Lennart Ackermans

The Finite Frequency Principle of Rational Credence

Abstract: Philosophers of epistemic probability or rational credence as well as philosophers of objective probability have often relied on the Infinite Frequency Principle, which states that if one knows what would be the limiting frequency of some outcome X (if one were to repeat an F-experiment an infinite number of times), then one should set one’s credence that a particular F-experiments results in X to the limiting frequency. I show that the Infinite Frequency Principle is false, and argue that it must be replaced by the Finite Frequency Principle. This principle states that if one knows that a finite sequence of F-experiments is likely to display converging behavior of the frequency of X towards p, one should set one's rational credence to p. The Finite Frequency Principle contains a 'likeliness' primitive that both theories of rational credence as well as chance need to be come to terms with.

Hylke Jellema

Using inference to the best explanation to evaluate eyewitness testimony

Abstract: Eyewitness testimony is crucial evidence in many criminal cases. However, it is also notoriously unreliable. I argue that when we assess the reliability of such testimony, we should engage in inference to the best explanation (IBE). On IBE, we may accept the testimony of an eyewitness when the best explanation of why she offers this testimony implies that it is (probably) true. I argue that IBE reliably leads to accurate conclusions about such a testimony. Furthermore, it is more feasible and informative when applied to real-world situations than its main competitor, the Bayesian approach to testimony. Finally, I show that it fits well with and allows us to improve upon current frameworks for assessing eyewitness reliability developed by psychologists.

Panel 14: Justice & Democracy
16.30-18.00h: Vondelzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek

Sanne Hupkes

Ideal and Non-Ideal Models of Justice

Abstract: Considering the ideal/non-ideal distinction in political philosophy as a distinction between ideal and non-ideal models, I suggest that ideal and non-ideal models are connected on a continuum ranging from highly idealized to very “realistic” models. Drawing on the philosophy of science literature on models, the developed approach accounts for and explains the functions of both ideal and non-ideal models and shows how these functions, and therefore also the models, are connected. Reflecting on the function of abstractions and idealizations, the approach furthermore offers a new way of interpreting existing critiques of ideal theory.

Jamie van der Klaauw

The Representative Turn in Democratic Theory

Abstract: In this short paper, I will present a new ‘wave’ of democratic theory called the ‘representative turn’. Their most important claim concerns the rehabilitation of political representation, which runs counter to contemporary pressures to move towards more ‘direct’ forms of democracy. My claim is that the ‘representative turn’ requires a constructivist understanding of the process of political representation. Only once the normative frame for
representative democracy is freed from a ‘metaphysics of presence’ can it be judged by its own standards. In the final part of the paper, I will relate this insight of political theory back to political practice, especially in the form of representation beyond the parliament.

Panel 15: Ethics, Banks, and Technology
16.30-18.00h: B.v. Zuylenzaal, Universiteitsbibliotheek

Sine Bagatur
Productive Justice and Technological Unemployment

Abstract: Political philosophers have spent a great deal of time specifying the principles of distributive justice. They have ignored, however, an equally important question of productive justice: how should the goods and services that are to be distributed according to the principles of justice be produced in the first place? In this paper, I will argue that for a complete view of the ideal of social justice, we need a theory of productive justice that does not focus only on the work ethic (the idea that there is an obligation to work), or on the criteria of meaningful work, but also on the questions of what makes the organization of production and division of (gains from) labor just. I will illustrate how such a thinking on productive justice can contribute to the normative thought about social justice by focusing on recent discussions about technological unemployment.

Dick Timmer
Earning Too Much: The Case for Maximum Income Policies

Abstract: What, if anything, can justify a maximum income? Despite some common objections against maximum income policies, we will argue that Rawlsian egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and desertism — three prominent approaches to taxation and justice in contemporary political philosophy — support them. All three approaches support relative maximum income policies, whereas desertism also supports absolute maximum income policies. Convergence of those very different theories on support for maximum income policies strengthens, in our view, the case for such policies.

Jens van ’T Klooster
The Ethics of Central Bank Risk Management

Abstract: The European Central Bank (ECB) justifies the design of its monetary policy operations with reference to a financial risk management strategy whose overarching objective is to avoid losses. What should we make of this justification? What are the normative ideas that inform it? Does it stand up to normative scrutiny? How does the specific topic of risk management fit into the broader ethics of monetary policy? In the presentation, I argue that the ECB’s risk management strategy is informed by a narrow shareholder-oriented conception of corporate responsibility, which is inappropriate for a public institution.

Day 2: Saturday, November 16th

Panel 16: The Scope of Duty
10.30-12.00h: C0.23, Oudemanhuispoort
Rob Compaijen
*Detachment and Parochialism in Ethics*

**Abstract:** In ethics, detachment — our capacity for transcending our present point of view — is both necessary and problematic. It is necessary because it allows us to combat parochialism. It is problematic because, as Nagel points out in *The View From Nowhere* (1986), radical detachment will result in nihilism. In this paper, I will (1) develop an account of detachment in ethics, (2) discuss the ideas of detached and engaged points of view, arguing that, in ethics, we need the attitude of ‘detached engagement’, and (3) reflect on the critical potential of this point of view.

Marina Uzunova, Benjamin Ferguson and Sebastian Köhler
*The Paradox of Supererogation*

**Abstract:** The existence of supererogatory acts — acts which are morally better than other permissible acts yet optional, rather than obligatory, to perform — enjoys strong intuitive support. Supererogation, however, is hard to reconcile with the idea that what is (most) morally good ought, morally, to be done. In this paper we present a novel version of this tension called the paradox of supererogation. We show that it follows from the clash of supererogation with two relations: a relation between goodness and reasons, and a relation between reasons and ought. The rest of the paper is devoted to a defense of these relations.

Willem van der Deijl
*Subjectivism, disbenefit, and degrees of wellbeing*

**Abstract:** We investigate to what extent subjectivism can account for degrees of wellbeing. We introduce two models: the relative model, which states that a person’s degree of wellbeing is described by how much pro-attitudes are satisfied relative to the set of values or desires a person has, and the absolute model, which sees degrees of wellbeing as the summation of the pro-attitudes that are satisfied. We argue that the first model fails to account for the disbenefit of certain types of depression, while the second fails to accommodate the intuition that reducing one’s pro-attitudes may sometimes directly benefit us, as well as a central commitment to subjectivism — the resonance constraint.

Panel 17: Games-Tinder-Technology
10.30-12.00h: C1.17, Oudemanhuispoort

Marijn Sax
*Just Fun and Games? Fortnite’s Transformation into a Content Delivery Platform and Its Manipulative Potential*

**Abstract:** Fortnite is a highly engaging and immersive video game played by 250 million people. In this paper, we observe that Fortnite is evolving into something beyond a game: Fortnite is becoming a ‘content delivery platform,’ where advertising and non-game related digital services and content are increasingly becoming natively integrated in the game experience. So while Fortnite looks and feels like a video game, it effectively becomes an instrument to approach gamers with commercial offers while they are playing a game. We argue that this development introduces a significant potential for manipulation that requires ethical evaluation and legal regulation.
Marjolein Lanzing

_Tapping the Heart: The commodification of Selves and Relationships on Tinder_

**Abstract:** In this paper I elaborate on the impact of dating-apps on our social relationships by investigating them from the perspective of commodification. My aim is to examine to what extent dating-apps that manage our intimate social relationships transform these relationships and to contribute conceptual clarifications for evaluating these technologies from the perspective of commodification. To this end I evaluate two phenomena of commodification on dating app Tinder: ‘being on the dating market’ and ‘being on the data market’. I explore whether these phenomena are harmful instances of commodification and what they mean for the way we understand ourselves and our social relationships. Do they empower us in finding a romantic match, or do they contribute to objectification of personal attributes, of selves or social relationships, reproducing vulnerabilities?

Philip Nickel

_Technological Disruption and Moral Uncertainty_

**Abstract:** This paper analyzes moral disruption, defined by Baker (2013) as a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to new norms. We explore the possibility that such moral uncertainty is a harm, looking at a historical case. We consider two objections to this view of harm: first, it does not correctly explain the positive value of moral uncertainty that arises in a reflective context such as a university classroom or a Socratic-style dialogue; and second, it does not explain the difference between uncertainty as progress, and as regress. We therefore adopt a challenging view instead.

_Panel 18: Global Justice_

10.30-12.00h: C1.23, Oudemanhuispoort

Gunter Bombaerts

_Scaling Energy Justice by Co-Creating Global Philosophy_

**Abstract:** Energy justice is still too ‘western’. Scaling energy justice needs world philosophy in which traditions creatively interact at specific points in the philosophical and policy arena. I address three exemplary issues. The energy justice concept itself seems too western, and the Hindi Niti, Nyāya and the Chinese yi concepts are discussed. The role of ‘community’ and ‘nature’ are illustrated by Ubuntu, the Chinese tianxia, the Kazakh Ethical Code and aboriginal ethics. Upscaling technologies and the energy concept are discussed by Greek, Daoist and Buddhist worldviews. These issues show the relevance of scaling energy justice by co-creating global philosophy.

Hao Wang

_Credit as a Techno-Political Phenomenon: Comparing the Notion of Credit in Western’s and China’s Credit System_

**Abstract:** The controversial project of China’s social credit system has aroused a plethora of attention. On the one hand, most Western commentators resolutely criticize the system as it calculates not only consumers’ financial risks but also their moral integrity and social obligation. The Chinese government, on the other, defends the system by arguing that the
Chinese term “credit” (xinyong) carries a broader meaning than its English-language counterpart. I will argue in this paper that both sides in the debate are bogged down in a mode of “credit essentialism” which wrongly assumes that the notion of credit is inherently different in each culture.

**Thomas Wells**

*In Defense of Evidential Uniqueness*

**Abstract:** Global GDP is more than 100 trillion dollars, yet 10% of the world’s population still live in extreme poverty on less than $1.90 per day. This paper argues that eliminating extreme poverty is an urgent moral obligation, and that a global basic income that transferred $1 per day from the rich world to each poor person is the most effective means to achieve it. In particular, I justify a global basic income against competing conceptions of global justice focused on fairer global institutions (Pogge 2008) and effective altruism (Singer 2009).

**Panel 19: Metaphysics**

10.30-12.00h: C2.05, Oudemanhuispoort

**Erhan Demircioglu**

*In Defense of Evidential Uniqueness*

**Abstract:** In this note, I argue for a thesis that I call Evidential Uniqueness, according to which there is, necessarily, at most one evidential rational doxastic attitude one can take towards a proposition, given a particular body of evidence. The Evidential Uniqueness Thesis differs significantly from a standard uniqueness thesis, which has been a topic of heated controversy in recent epistemology, by resting on the assumption that there is such a thing as evidential rationality (that the notion of evidential rationality is not vacuous). After arguing for the non-triviality of the Evidential Uniqueness Thesis, I advance the Argument from Evidential Support (to defend the thesis and argue for its soundness). There are a considerable number of intricate issues surrounding a proper defense of the Evidential Uniqueness Thesis and there is thus much to be gained from a sustained focus on it.

**Savvas Ioannou**

*Source of Reality/Causal Capacity: Outside of the Priority Chain?*

**Abstract:** I will consider two views: metaphysical foundationalism (there are fundamental entities) and metaphysical infinitism (there are infinite chains of ontological dependence). There is a foundationalist intuition that there must be a fundamental level that is the source of reality (Schaffer) or causal capacity (Trogdon) of grounded entities, because a grounded entity inherits its reality or causal capacity from its ground. I will argue that this argument is not successful, since the source of reality or causal capacity of an infinite chain can be the cause of it. Therefore, a vicious regress is avoided because there is no transference of the same status ad infinitum.

**Panel 20: Psychiatry/Medicine**

10.30-12.00h: C2.17, Oudemanhuispoort
Sander Werkhoven  

*Psychiatric Categories: Natural Kinds or Conventions*  

**Abstract:** The use of psychiatric labels (e.g. autism, ADHD, Schizophrenia, etc) remains heavily contested, inside and outside of academic circles. In recent years, the philosophical debate has shifted towards the question whether diagnostic classificatory kinds in psychiatry should be seen as natural kinds or as conventional/socially constructed kinds. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to dispel several confusions about the natural kinds view that have informed the majority of the criticisms so far; second, to argue that even on a successful defence of the natural kind view we cannot settle the central the central questions the debate tried to answer, namely which mental and behavioural conditions really are mental illnesses? Several suggestions are offered for further progress.

Joel Anderson  

*Labeling without Slurring*  

**Abstract:** Increasingly, calls are being heard for the abolition of labels such as “autism” or “ADHD”. But it is also difficult to deny that some vocabulary is needed for communicating about various aspects of the phenomena, etiology, and experiences connected to these labels – especially when employed by individuals presenting their experiences to others. In this paper, I identify several useful functions for labels and distinguish (contextually) appropriate uses of labels for pernicious forms, building on recent work in the pragmatics of language on what is distinctive about “slurs” as compared with phrases that are presumably merely descriptive.

Mayli Mertens  

*Fatal Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Predicting Quality of Life*  

**Abstract:** A self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP) is a prediction that ensures its own truth. In medical prognosis, when prediction guides the decision about whether to continue patient care, the stakes are literally life-and-death. Although the risk of SFPs is recognized in both the medical literature and bioethics, the prevailing views of SFPs are dramatically incomplete. I argue that a thorough evaluation of prognostic practices requires us to identify SFPs at two interconnected levels. I furthermore show how these SFPs, especially when iterated, endanger good medical practice and complicate innovation and policy in significant ways. Finally, I suggest interventions for identifying mistaken prognoses and breaking ensuing feedback loops.

Panel 21: Environment and Morality  

14.00-15.30h: C0.23, Oudemanhuispoort

Lisa Doeland  

*Learning to Waste Well: Towards a non-anthropocentric ethics of waste*  

**Abstract:** What if we took waste not as inert, undead matter, but as a remnant of a sign of life? To continue to exist, all animals make waste – we eat, we digest, we execrate. In this paper I take Jacques Derrida’s encouragement to “eat well” to heart, complement it with Val Plumwood’s suggestion to “conceive of ourselves in edible terms” and ask what it would
mean to “waste well”. In doing so I sketch the outlines of a non-anthropocentric ethics of waste.

Brandt van der Gaast
No Harm, No Foul: A Person-Affecting Axiology
Abstract: Why do we care about reducing our carbon footprint? Presumably, because it provides benefits for future people, to whom we have obligations. But how does the overall value of a future depend upon the well-being of the people that exist in it? Population ethicists and economists have studied this relationship closely. In this paper, I develop and defend a population axiology of a person-affecting type. I argue that a satisfactory population axiology should imply a number of intuitive principles: Strong Pareto, Neutral Existence, Saving the Larger Number, and Number Does Not Trump Size. I argue that a theory which I call ‘Parettian Harm Minimization’ does the best job in meeting these requirements.

Jan Willem Wieland
A Kantian Approach to the Tragedy of the Commons
Abstract: Even though I strongly prefer a clean city, it is better for me to drive a polluting car to avoid unnecessary costs. The problem is that the same reasoning holds for everyone else, and if we all act accordingly, we end up with a polluted city. The question arises: are there good reasons to cooperate in such “tragedies of the commons”? In the literature, we find various proposals including participation-based and fairness-based reasons to cooperate. In this paper, I explore a different approach, namely a Kantian one, and argue that, under certain conditions, “the formula of universal law” might well yield reasons to cooperate.

Panel 22: Anger-Shame-Responsibility
14.00-15.30h: C.123, Oudemanhuispoort

Robert Pál-Wallin
What is this thing called Anger?
Abstract: Recently, Martha Nussbaum (2016) has argued that anger conceptually involves a wish for payback, which she believes to be normatively problematic. Anger is therefore problematic along with it. In this paper, I will argue against Nussbaum’s view and, against the backdrop of recent empirical data, propose that we should think of anger as a heterogeneous affect class and that the instances of affect episodes which we denote with the umbrella term ‘anger’ may vary with respect to physiological changes, bodily expressions, action tendencies and phenomenological quality. In essence, I will argue for a pluralistic account of anger, which I call ‘Hedonic Functionalism’. According to this view, ‘anger’ refers to a plurality of affective phenomena which share a ‘family resemblance’ to one another. This resemblance is cashed out in terms of two generic properties (1) functional bodily changes and (2) a hedonic quality (hedonic tone or set of hedonic tones).

Yvette Drissen
Shame, inequality, and the poor
Abstract: Shame is a common emotion amongst those with a low socioeconomic status. A plausible explanation for this is the prevailing idea that we live in a meritocratic society and thus the presumption that one’s socioeconomic situation is the result of one’s own ability and
effort. Shame occurs as a reaction to the sense of failing to live up to the social expectations, which, in turn, become internalised personal aspirations. Recognising that other factors, such as upbringing, wealth and chance also determine someone’s socioeconomic position might take away feelings of shame amongst the poor, thereby improving their situation.

Judith van Ooijen
(Not-) Taken On Responsibility
Abstract: In political spheres, taking on responsibility can become such a complicated endeavour that it can result in responsibility that is 1) not, or 2) wrongly taken on. This in turn can lead to political residue; an attitude of mostly negative emotions aimed at the government. In this paper I will introduce a typology of non- and wrongly taken on responsibility. I will furthermore identify two features of situations that are prone to develop non- or wrongly taken on responsibility: 1) when there is a possibility for a mix-up between responsibility-as-accountability and responsibility-as-task, and 2) when a responsibility gap is present.

Panel 23: The Political and Decision Making
14.00-15.30h: C2.05, Oudemanhuispoort

Julien Kloeg
Dissociation or Association? Schmittian and Arendtian Perspectives on the Political
Abstract: Theorists of political difference distinguish between (institutional) politics on the one hand and the political on the other in order to divorce politics from the state, which in turn allows for a diagnosis of ‘unpolitical politics’. I outline three variations on the political: (1) the association thesis, which following Arendt emphasizes the moment of association between communities or groups; (2) the dissociation thesis, which following Schmitt emphasizes the possibility of antagonism; and (3) the conflict thesis, which identifies the political with actual antagonism. I argue against the association thesis and the conflict thesis on the basis that both confute the political with political action, thereby reducing the political to a pure performance that remains mysterious. Schmitt’s emphasis on possibility means that he is able to incorporate a conceptual dimension into the political and thereby explain its possibility. The dissociation thesis thus provides the most convincing account of the political.

Natascha Rietdijk
Populism and the Political Mobilization of Echo Chambers
Abstract: Some scholars claim the danger of echo chambers has been vastly overstated. In my paper, I reassess this claim by calling attention to the relation between populist rhetoric and the creation and reinforcement of echo chambers. Taking the case of the Italian anti-vaccination movement as my example, I argue that populist rhetoric can reshape echo chambers in order to politically mobilize them. As I will show, it does so by focusing their attention towards distrusting a (liberal) epistemic elite, thus further contributing to a post-truth narrative.

Tom Kayzel
Cold War Rationality, Decision Models and Technocratic Politics
Abstract: This paper seeks to understand how economics influenced the public sphere in the second half of the 20th century by investigating the legacy of economic rationality on
conceptions of politics. Rather than connecting economic rationality with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, the paper shows the influence of economic rationality on technocratic policies in the 1950s and 1960s. To make this case, this paper maps out one specific way of how economic rationality spread in the Netherlands after the Second World War in policymakers circles through so-called decision models. These models, the paper argues, played an important role in corporatist politics of the 1950s contributing to politics based on pacification and exclusion of radical politics, resulting in a technocratic style of politics.

Panel 24: Authority and the Moral Agent
14.00-15.30h: C2.17, Oudemanhuispoort

Savriël Dillingh
The Unjust Authority Approach to the Firm
Abstract: Certain acts of employer authority are prima facie morally wrong and require a justificatory criterion. The Market-Failure Approach to business ethics appeals to transaction costs to justify employer authority. By adopting the normative framework, the approach assumes, however, that employer authority is only morally justified if it exists in the spirit of combatting uneconomical transaction costs. This line of argument allows for a justificatory criterion for employer authority without importing exogenous political principles: acts of employer authority are only legitimate and non coercive if they are exerted in the spirit of cutting transaction costs.

Thijs Heijmeskamp
Assessing dual-process theory in moral psychology
Abstract: In recent decades the application of dual-process theory has been popular in the field of moral psychology. Dual-process theory maintains that there are two types of cognitive processes. Some of the goals for its application in moral psychology are: to shed light on whether morality is a rational or intuitive process, a matter of emotion or reason, or to support certain normative ethical theories. In this talk I will assess whether or not the application of dual-process theory has met the goals which motivate its use in moral psychology.

Panel 25: Ethics and AI
16.00-17.30h: C0.17, Oudemanhuispoort

Owen King
Ethics of Artificial Social Cognition: Groundwork and Exemplification
Abstract: This paper delineates and engages the ethics of artificial social cognition. Social cognition comprises the processes by which humans understand one another. Artificial systems are now capable of engaging in social cognition as well, predicting and classifying human mental states. Yet, the evidence from which these systems draw their conclusions differs significantly from the evidence on which humans do, or even could, rely. We give two general philosophical arguments for thinking that there are distinctive ethical issues for
artificial social cognition. Then we raise two particular moral concerns about the development and use of artificial systems for social cognition.

**Sven Nyholm**

*Can Robots act for Reasons?*

**Abstract:** When we create robots that might harm human beings (such as self-driving cars or military robots), the question arises of whether they can act rightly or wrongly. According to the field of machine ethics, robots can be designed to act on moral principles. Criticizing this view, some philosophers have recently argued that robots cannot act for reasons. Is that correct? In my presentation, I will discuss and critically assess that claim from two points of view: (i) the robot as an agent considered in isolation and (ii) the robot considered as a part of a human-robot collaboration.

**Jilles Smids**


**Abstract:** Given the central role of car-driving in developed countries, and given the many yearly traffic deaths and injuries, the ‘ethics of driving’ have been studied surprisingly little (Evans, 2008; Fahlquist, 2009; Husak, 2004). In my paper, I will argue that road traffic risks are morally problematic in several respects. First, traffic risks do not outweigh the benefits. A second problem is the uneven and unfair distribution of traffic risks and benefits among different road users. A third problem is the lack of feasible precaution taken. A fourth problem is the lack of informed consent by pedestrians and cyclists to the risks imposed on them.

**Panel 26: Kant (Practical Philosophy)**

16.00-18.30h: C0.23, Oudeemanhuispoort

**Marijana Vujosevic**

*Kant’s Conception of Moral Strength*

**Abstract:** Most scholars assume that Kantian moral strength is needed only when it comes to following maxims. However, accounts based on this assumption can be challenged by Kant’s claim that virtue, as moral strength of the human will, can never become a habit because its maxims must be freely adopted in new situations. Even some accounts that are not based on this assumption fail to meet this challenge. By drawing on my interpretation of the Kantian capacity for self-control, I propose a twofold account of moral strength, which can accommodate Kant’s point that maxims of virtue must always be freely adopted.

**Michael Gregory**

*Kant’s Duty to Create a Fashionable Morality*

**Abstract:** Kant’s ethics is often portrayed as a bloodless dogmatism and duty as an ugly, severe demand. So, we might be surprised to find that Kant argues for a duty to make morality fashionable, or popular. I argue that Kant makes it a duty of virtue to present a beautiful illusion of virtue in social intercourse that brings together the social graces and the moral law into a system of mutually binding social expectations of virtue. The systematic application of this duty creates a sensible correlate to the idea of a cosmopolitan moral community by establishing a disposition of mutual love and respect.
Panel 27: Rejection

16.00-17.30h: C1.17, Oudemanshuispoort

Leila Bussière
Theories of Rejection

Abstract: Against bilateralist projects, two ‘messy’ aspects of rejection have been proposed: weak rejection and pragmatic rejection. They have been taken to preclude the use of rejection in deductions. I take this as a sign that we need a comprehensive account of the speech act of rejection, that explains whether weak rejection or pragmatic rejection belong to the same category as the strong rejection bilateralists want to use. Thus, I construct theories of rejection from each of the four competing theories of assertion and analyze their answer to the messiness of rejection.

Giorgio Sbardolini and Luca Incurvati
The Rejection Game

Abstract: We introduce game-theoretic models of conversational interactions called Rejection games. In these games, a speaker asserts something, and plays against a hearer who can accept or reject what the speaker asserted. We study the effects of rejection, and argue that the possibility for the hearer to reject assertions may induce cooperative (Gricean) behaviour in the speaker, under plausible assumptions.

Panel 28: Phenomenology

16.00-17.30h: C1.23, Oudemanshuispoort

Corijn van Mazijk
Husserl and Phenomenal Intentionality

Abstract: Mendelovici (2018) offers a new defense of phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT): the view that phenomenal consciousness gives rise to intentional states. This paper reflects on some key aspects of Mendelovici’s theory in relation to a broadly Husserlian way of considering the relation between phenomenal content and intentionality. For the most part, I will focus on PIT’s construal of sensations. Against PIT, I defend an alternative account based on Husserl’s concept of immanent association – a reading which bears some superficial similarity to work by Block, Peacocke, and Kind, among others. Central to this reading is that phenomenal content would not necessarily give rise to intentionality.

Athamos Stradis
Macrostates as Phenomenological

Abstract: In statistical mechanics, any system has a determinate microscopic configuration (‘microstate’). However, we are generally ignorant of such matters, and can only discern a system’s macroscopic features like temperature, volume, etc. A characterisation in terms of such coarse-grained parameters (‘macrostate’) is generally consistent with many possible underlying microstates.

How do macrostates come about? More pointedly, what underlies the fact that some
microstates, but not others, appear the same to an observer (e.g. human)? The standard view is that there is a physically meaningful sense in which two microstates are indistinguishable to an observer, and that this grounds our subjective, phenomenological sense of their ‘looking the same’. I shall argue against this view, for any attempt to physically cash out the indistinguishability of microstates to an observer must ultimately fall back on our own conception of what counts as a macrostate. The phenomenological character of macrostates, therefore, cannot be avoided.

Panel 29: Metaphysics/Ontology

16.00-17.30h: C2.05, Oudemanshuispoort

Martin Lipman

From Spatial Variation to Perspectival Variations

Abstract: We can distinguish pairs of incompatible properties such as the properties of being straight and being bent, from pairs of contrary determinations such as being straight and not straight. Metaphysicians standardly accept bridge principles connecting these two pairs of properties. For example, it is a standard assumption that, necessarily, if anything is straight, then it is not bent. I will call these contrariety principles. Such contrariety principles, together with the principle of non-contradiction, imply that objects cannot have incompatible properties. They effectively collapse metaphysical incompatibility into logical contrariety. In this talk, I will look more closely at contrariety principles and their role in metaphysics. I will argue that the contrariety principles, when left unqualified, are false and not obviously part of our pre-theoretic understanding of the world. Some heavily qualified contrariety principles might be true but, I will argue, these will be of little metaphysical interest.

Jing Yu

The Complexity-Reduction Problem for Lewis' Humean Ontology

Abstract: This paper argues that Lewis' Humean ontology inevitably commits the problem of complexity reduction. The complexity reduction problem means that Humean ontology entails an impossible scenario in which the physical world can be modeled by the distribution of natural numbers in a coordinate of a certain space of which the topology and dimension is the same with the physical world concerned. This is impossible because it can be proved that the categorical difference among properties in the physical world cannot be mapped onto the system of the distribution of natural numbers. Hence, the Humean ontology is challenged. Furthermore, it can be proved that the categorical differences among properties are grounded by the spatiotemporal stable relations among properties. Hence the spatiotemporal stable relations are necessary for the identities of the properties. It manifests a kind of local necessity, which precedes the existence of other possible worlds. Hence, Lewis modal reductivism is challenged, too.

Michael Hegarty

Plural Reference to Vague Objects

Abstract: Contemporary work on ontic vagueness proposes that if vagueness is in the world, reference to vague objects must be indeterminate. I argue that, if this is right, Gareth Evans’ argument against vague objects fails because his assumptions about them cannot
capture this referential indeterminacy intuition. I develop what I argue is a fairer characterisation of vague objects as fuzzy pluralities — successful reference to which is plural reference — thereby capturing referential indeterminacy. However, ultimately I show an Evans-style argument can still be made against this improved characterisation. Hence the prospects are still bleak for vague objects.

**Poster Presentations**

**Eleonora d'Annibale**  
*Defence of a Principle of International Corrective Justice*  
**Abstract:** The paper I would like to present examines the possibility of the addition of a principle to the Rawlsian Law of Peoples. The principle at stake is concerned with international corrective justice and it is aimed at rectifying past violations of human rights. It entails apologies from the perpetrator to the victim as well as, in some cases, economic redistribution. The redistributive part of the principle is modelled in analogy with Rawlsian difference principle and it is defended from both a consequentialist and a deontological perspective.

**Dimitri van Capelleveen**  
*A Solution to the Problem of Intertheoretic Value Comparisons*  
**Abstract:** How should we decide under normative uncertainty, that is, while giving credence to multiple normative theories that prescribe different options? According to the popular Maximize Expected Choice-Worthiness (MEC), only the option(s) with the greatest expected choice-worthiness is (are) rationally permissible. Applications of MEC require comparisons of choice-worthiness between normative theories. Developing a method to non-arbitrarily make such comparisons is the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons, the greatest challenge facing MEC. In this paper, I present a method that most agents—if they give credence to certain propositions concerning the correctness of choice-worthiness assignments—can use to non-arbitrarily make such comparisons.

**Marc Cheong**  
*Bad Faith, Fake News, and the Untrue Crowd: Existentialist Dangers of Social Media*  
**Abstract:** The easy access to, and consumption of, online social networks (social media) sites leads to various sociocultural issues. I draw upon existentialist philosophy, and network theory, to explain the various phenomenological issues plaguing social media users. I argue that an asymmetric structure is detrimental: it contributes to the objectification of users and inauthentic behaviour (contrary to claims by so-called 'influencers'). Secondly, herd behaviour and Kierkegaardian untruth tie into the lack of accountability on social media. I will conclude by highlighting the dangers of social media to an individual through some contemporary examples, and by suggesting changes that may promote existential ideals.
Giuseppe Colonna and Gaetano Masciullo
How does Time matter to Categories?
Abstract: What does it mean to be in time? From the Late Antiquity to Contemporary Philosophy, the Aristotelian account about this question has been continually mentioned as an inevitable cornerstone to live up to. Nevertheless, some ambiguities in the original texts have generated very surprising and opposing “Aristotelian” accounts about this problem: authors from different ages and from different places, only unified by the Aristotelian ground, propose very original conceptions about the “place” of time in the logical Aristotelian frame.

We will try to explain the problem of the original Aristotelian texts, after which we will figure out what the most important accounts are, only to reason in the conclusion what the most reasonable option is.

Dean McHugh
How to Cause the Inevitable
Abstract: This talk is about how events which we commonly take to be inevitable, such as death, can have causes. Contemporary dependence approaches to actual causation are committed to the idea that only contingent events can have causes. In this talk we make two contributions to recent analyses of actual causation (such as Lewis, 1973, 2000; Yablo, 2002; Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Halpern, 2016; Beckers and Vennekens, 2018). Firstly, we raise a general problem for the most popular solution to the problem of inevitable effects. Secondly, we adapt a recent account (Beckers and Vennekens, 2018) to explain under what conditions inevitable events have causes. The upshot is a clearer view on a seemingly intractable problem for actual causation.

Austin Vanderburgt
Slow Institutional Development as a Response to the Problem of Climate Change
Abstract: This poster will examine the effects of “Slow Institutional Development” in response to the ever-worsening problem of climate change. Essentially, by engaging in slow institutional change, we ought to be able to avoid the problems of rapid institutional change, the unfeasibility of radical social engineering, the implementation problems of modern democratic politics, and the time-sensitive nature of climate change specifically. Although counterintuitive, ‘slow development of institutions’ might be a feasible solution which would not only have to convince government agents but also the public and the private sector. Institutions breed cooperation (see for example institutional market economics), which allow us to bypass many of the psychological limitations and allow for more rapid moral and technological progress. I approach this topic from an interdisciplinary perspective involving practical philosophy, cognitive psychology and behavioral science. The structure of this poster will be uncomplicated, while outlining the problem and providing case examples.

Emma Young
Immanent Critique and the Ideal
Abstract: The topic of the poster is immanent critique and the ideal. It contains a chronological overview of the demands for reason in three distinct moments: Hegel, Marx and contemporary Critical Theory. Starting from Hegel’s conception of immanent critique, the poster emphasizes the conceptual content of the object of critique to provide a norm or an
ideal to compare it to. Moving vertically downwards on to Marx, I highlight how suspicion of bourgeois reason contributes to the shunning of the formulation of positive ideals and the necessity of a negativist critique. Ending with Critical Theory, I point at an ambiguity in the metaphysical character of the ideal: whereas perhaps utopian thinking has been proven as being unavoidable to social critique, there are strong post-metaphysical ambitions for exercising critique, by rejecting a final teleology of history. In sum, this thread exhibits in a vertical manner variations of the demands for the immanence of reason.

Rebecca Zeilstra

Sunstein’s Transparency Condition: Tension With Autonomy?

Abstract: Cass Sunstein advocates that nudges are only legitimate when they are transparent. My research is concerned with whether this transparency condition is in tension with Sunstein’s claims about autonomy. On my poster, I will schematically represent my conceptual analysis of Sunstein’s understanding of transparency and autonomy. Furthermore, I will present my core message in a diagram: that Sunstein’s ideas about autonomy and transparency are in tension. Sunstein implies that nudges could help promote autonomy as authenticity, since nudges could help people save time for activities they genuinely care about. Yet, Sunstein’s transparency condition will turn nudging into a time costly practice. When this condition would be effective it would demand that people effectively absorb information about each nudge they encounter. At last, I will briefly discuss how Sunstein could resolve this tension, and present bullet-points to represent three different solutions and the consequences of these solutions.