



# 2018 OZSW CONFERENCE

9 & 10 November 2018

## **Local Host and Conference Organisation**

Faculty of Behavioural, Managerial, Social Sciences,

Department of Philosophy

University of Twente

# Table of Contents

<b>ORGANISATION.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>CONFERENCE SCHEDULE .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>KEYNOTE LECTURES .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>PANEL (ALPHABETICAL ORDER).....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>EXTENDED ABSTRACTS IN ORDER OF PRESENTATION (SYMPOSIUM) .....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>POSTERS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER.....</b>	<b>58</b>

# Organisation

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## Conference Schedule

### Friday, November 9

*length (minutes)*

10.00-11.00	60'	Coffee and registration
11.00-11.15	15'	Opening and welcome
11.15-12.15	60'	Keynote 1:
12.15-13.15	60'	Lunch
13.15-14.30	75'	Panel 1 (6 parallel)
14:30-15.45	75'	Panel 2 (6 parallel)
15.45-16.15	30'	Coffee/Tea break
16.15-17.30	75'	Panel 3 (6 parallel)
17.30-18.30	60'	Keynote 2:
18.30-19.15	30'	Drinks
19.15-21.00	90'	Conference dinner

### Saturday, November 10

09.15-10.00	30'	Coffee and 2nd registration
10.00-11.00	60'	Keynote 3:
11:00-12.15	75'	Panel 4 (6 parallel)
12.15-13.30	90'	Lunch
13.30-14.45	45'	Panel discussion with keynote speakers
14:15-16.00	75'	Panel 5 (6 parallel)
16,00-16.30	45'	Closure

## Keynote Lectures

### **Toleration or Engagement? Responding to Divisiveness in Democracies**

*Maeve Cooke*  
*(University College Dublin)*

Ethical collisions are part of collective human life. By this I mean encounters between individuals and groups whose identities are shaped by conflicting views as to how humans should live their lives, which in turn shape their everyday behaviour and practices. I call these ‘ideas of the good life’. Such ideas may be based on cultural traditions, religious beliefs, philosophical positions, political ideologies, or other allegiances. They may be held tacitly rather than explicitly and are connected in complex ways with economic interests, claims to justice, struggles for freedom, and other individual and collective motivations. In the history of democratic modernity, encounters between groups who hold diverging or conflicting ideas of the good life have been seen as a source of social divisiveness and polarization. In response, John Rawls advocates liberal constitutionalism as a model of democratic politics that enables a reasonably harmonious and stable pluralist society, based on the successful and peaceful practice of toleration. I propose an alternative model of democratic politics. In my alternative account, encounters between diverging or even conflicting ideas of the good life are not avoided but encouraged. At its centre is a conception of authoritative, but non-authoritarian authority, underpinned by an account of the freedom-constituting powers of social institutions.

### **Arguments, Authority, and Polarization in Later Medieval Philosophy**

*Russell Friedman (KU Leuven)*

In the polarized environment of, say, contemporary American politics, the polarization has a strong cognitive component, whereby the polarization correlates strongly with our susceptibility to certain arguments and even facts, our notion of truth, and our attitude towards experts and authorities. A similar polarization can be found in later medieval university philosophy, with its roots in rival intellectual and religious traditions that coalesced around the two big mendicant orders, the Dominicans and the Franciscans. In this paper, after giving some crucial information on the medieval institutional and intellectual background to the polarization I will be describing, I will give some examples of how that

polarization manifested itself, in particular by showing how the polarized groups exhibited different attitudes towards arguments and authorities. Possible areas that I'll use to investigate this medieval polarization are: divine illumination, hylomorphism, and trinitarian theology.

## **Fake News and the Politics of Truth**

*Michael Lynch (University of Connecticut)*

Fake news spread online is a clear danger to democratic politics. One aspect of that danger is obvious: it spreads misinformation. But other aspects, less often discussed, are that it also spreads confusion, undermines trust and encourages us to live in a kind of epistemic bad faith. In this talk, I will argue that it is this last aspect that captures the most pernicious effect of fake news and related propaganda. In particular, I'll argue that its effectiveness is due in part to a curious blindness on the part of many users of social media: a kind of semantic blindness to the function of their online communicative acts. This blindness makes us not only vulnerable to manipulation to those with a better understanding of the semantic character of online communication, it indirectly undermines the political value of truth—or more exactly, the pursuit of truth, by diminishing confidence in the institutions that protect and encourage that value.

## **Panel (Alphabetical Order)**

### **Admiration Over Time**

*Alfred Archer (Tilburg University) and Ben Matheson (Stockholm University)*

We present a puzzle about the conditions on becoming admirable and remaining admirable. While some work on responsibility has distinguished the conditions (e.g. Khoury 2013, Matheson 2014), all work on admiration has so far focused on the first question. We will present cases that show that a person can cease being admirable for performing an act that they were once admirable for performing. We will consider three explanations for this fact and consider the problems faced by each. We will argue that the most plausible explanation is that admiration over time is sensitive to defeaters.

### **Value sensitive designers: A person centered account of co-creative innovation**

*Mandi Astola (Eindhoven University of Technology)*

I investigate at the practice of co-creation for technological innovation. I begin with the naïve view which states that virtuous people make good co-creators. However, sometimes epistemic and moral vices of individuals create collective epistemic or moral virtue. I propose adapting our view of virtues by making distinction between individual and collective virtues and between consequential and procedural virtues. I want to create a role-based and multi-layered virtue theory to understand co-creation for technological innovation.

### **What Does Fairness in Trade Require? Do We Need a Difference Principle?**

*Sine Bagatur (Leiden University)*

In *Fairness in Practice* (2012), James proposes three principles as basic requirements of fairness in international trade. According to the International Relative Gains principle; national income gains due to international trade need to be distributed equally. In this paper, I will argue that considering the role of increasing and diminishing returns in international trade, we can conceptualize international trade practice not as a relation of mutual gain but rather as a relation of unequal exchange. This view of international trade opens up the question of whether we need a Difference Principle as a requirement of fairness in international trade.

## **Formalizing Mental Causation**

*Sander Beckers (Utrecht University)*

The exclusion argument presents a challenge to the non-reductive physicalist: how can there be mental causation in a physically closed world? The non-reductive physicalist holds that a mental state supervenes on a physical state, but is not reducible to it. Therefore she seems forced to accept that many actions have two distinct sufficient causes, and are thus overdetermined. But overdetermination of an event by two causes is deemed to be highly exceptional, to the extent that it is highly implausible to be as widespread as mundane cases of mental causation are. This paper takes up this challenge.

## **Of Savages and Stoics: Conjectural History as a Republican Tool in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson**

*Rudmer Bijlsma (University of Lausanne)*

Scholars tend to drive a sharp wedge between the conjectural histories of the ‘speculative’ Rousseau and those of the ‘empirical’ Scottish Enlightenment social theorists. This paper argues that the convergences in the conjectural histories of Adam Ferguson – the most ambivalent among the Scots vis-à-vis commercial society’s merits – and Rousseau are more fundamental than often assumed. It does so by scrutinizing two related oppositions in their histories: nature vs. art, and savage vs. civilized. For both thinkers, it is argued, the figures of the Stoic and the savage serve a similar role as exemplars of moral- psychological wholeness.

## **Multi-aspectual approach to Values in the Refugee Chain**

*Christine Boshuizen- van Burken (Erasmus University Rotterdam)*

We approach the problem of refugee logistics from a value sensitive design (VSD) perspective. VSD is a tripartite design methodology, which implies conceptual, empirical and technical investigations. Our first step is to understand current values in the refugee chain. This is done via a stakeholder meeting and a multi-aspectual analysis. The second step is to understand why values in the refugee chain (potentially) clash with values of stakeholders, and in particular with values of refugees. The third step is to provide stakeholders with guidelines on how to improve their contribution in the refugee chain in a value sensitive manner.

## **Who Decides? An Argument for Democratic Selection Criteria for Refugees**

*Amanda Cavston (Tilburg University)*

In our non-ideal world, states refuse to fully open their borders to refugees, leading some to advocate a ‘triage’ approach and formulation of selection criteria that ensures refugees suffering the most persecution are helped first. I reject this approach, arguing that it lends further legitimacy to an unjust state sovereignty system and perpetuates harmful institutional practices. Instead, I argue for the democratic determination of selection criteria, where such criteria are determined by refugees themselves. While imperfect, the proposal is flawed in a transformative way that prompts measures to empower refugees and that undermines the ideological basis for the status quo.

## **Intellectual Virtues, Justified Emotions, and Synchronic Self-Control**

*Chun-Nam Chan (The University of Manchester)*

I shall propose an emotional theory of self-control, according to which the exercise of synchronic self-control requires the assistance of justified emotions (JEs) that are produced by the agent’s intellectual virtues, which are reliable emotion-making processes, that constantly generate correct and proportionate emotions (CPEs). The intellectual virtues reliably detect the non-evaluative properties of a competing temptation that likely constitute an associated evaluative property and generate a corresponding JE. With the assistance of the JE, the agent can control herself at the same moment the temptation is attacking her because the JE directly overwhelms the self-indulgent desire alongside the self-disciplined one.

## **What Pride, Mr. President? On Pride and Politics**

*Martha Claeys (University of Antwerpen)*

Politicians often appeal to the emotion of pride in order to convince people of their program. In this paper, I argue that the assumption that underlies the kind of pride that is being addressed determines whether the pride rhetoric is either polarizing or unifying. The emotion of pride can rely on two entirely opposite assumptions. One of inequality and competition, and one of radical equality. Acknowledging and paying attention to the role feelings of pride play, both in the politician’s rhetoric and in the voter’s decision, is fundamental to set apart intolerant demands from legitimate grievances.

## **Can we be held responsible for implicit bias? The Ignored Pitfalls of Implicit Prejudice Research**

*Roland den Boef (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)*

Implicit bias has become a hot topic in moral philosophy. This paper offers a critical evaluation of implicit bias as a psychological, scientific construct. Implicit bias tests are found wanting with regards to their reliability and predictive validity. Scientific research cannot support claims of near-universal bias prevalence, widespread consequent discrimination, or accurate individual assessment. First-person awareness of implicit bias cannot ground blame for other biased persons. These findings mean that we cannot hold people responsible for discriminatory behavior caused by implicit bias. Consequences for policy are discussed, including anti-implicit bias training, and impact on philosophical debates.

## **Conscious Control and Responsibility for Habits**

*Wessel van Dommelen (University of Groningen)*

Whether agents need to be in conscious control of their actions in order to be morally responsible is controversial. Agents seem responsible in two kinds of cases in which they lack conscious control: undeliberate omissions and habitual behavior. I claim that one can be responsible for habitual behavior, but not for undeliberate omissions. I argue that the ‘historical consciousness thesis’ accommodates for responsibility for habitual behavior. On this view, conscious control need not be proximal, but can be distal. Furthermore, agents can be responsible for habitual behavior in some cases where the decision leading to the behavior is automatized.

## **Context, Content, and the Inferential Specification of Meaning**

*Matej Drobnák (Univerzita Hradec Králové, Czech Republic)*

In this presentation, I try to show how the inferential specification of meaning can be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, it opens up the way for a specific inferential view on semantic understanding. Second, I try to show how the inferential specification of meaning can be used to explain cases of ambiguity, free pragmatic enrichment, and conversational implicatures. The aim of this presentation is to establish theoretical foundations on which future discussions could be launched from the perspective of normative inferentialism – especially with regard to the topics discussed within the literalism-contextualism debate.

## **A Formal Impossibility Result for Methodological Individualism**

*Hein Duijf (Utrecht University), Allard Tamminga (University of Groningen) and Frederik Van De Putte (Ghent University)*

In the philosophy of the social sciences, individualism is the methodological precept that any social phenomenon is to be explained ultimately in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals. Such a reduction includes bridge laws that translate social terms into individualistic statements that contain only individualistic terms. We focus on the notion of collective deontic admissibility, which is of central relevance to the study of collective responsibility and collective rationality. Using methods from modal logic, we show that there are no bridge laws that translate collective deontic admissibility into individualistic statements.

## **Why buy local?**

*Ben Ferguson (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) and Chris Thompson (UiT The Arctic University of Norway)*

This paper discusses the moral arguments that speak in favour of three consumer options: buying local food, buying global (non-local) food, and buying global food while also purchasing carbon offsets to mitigate the environmental impact of food transportation. We argue that because the offsetting option allows one to provide economic benefits to the poorest food workers while also mitigating the environmental impact of food transportation it is morally superior to the alternatives.

## **To be or not to be... sets!**

*Michele Ginammi (Politecnico di Milano)*

Are natural numbers sets? Benacerraf (1968) argued that they are not, because multiple equivalent set theoretic reductions are possible. Steinhart (2002) rejects Benacerraf's conclusion and offers a mathematical proof that numbers are finite von Neumann ordinals. In this talk I will present this proof and I will argue that it is not valid. I will then discuss the implications of this failure for contemporary arithmetic set theoretic reductionism and I will argue that the only option for set reductionists is to support some strong and controversial version of Naturalism.

## **Nudging and decisional privacy**

*Eva Groen-Reijman (Wageningen University)*

Since its introduction, the concept of nudging has raised questions of legitimacy. Rather than considering nudging as a form of manipulation, this paper

distinguishes between different nudges by focusing on the relationship between the nudger and the person nudged. It does so by presenting a view of decisional privacy - the dimension of privacy that concerns the right to make one's own decisions - that recognizes privacy norms as context-dependent. It thus addresses a question that so far has been undertheorized in the nudging debate: how the legitimacy of a nudge may depend, in part, on who does the nudging.

## **From Fangirl back to Philosopher: Analysing the Work of Mme de Staël**

*Eveline Groot (Erasmus University Rotterdam)*

An investigation of the historical reception of Mme de Staël's theoretical work, through a comparison of two commentaries, reveals a remarkable contrast of views with regard to the status of this author. Whereas Underwood describes De Staël as a Rousseauistic fangirl, Jacquinet calls her a female genius and enlightened predecessor. However, De Staël should be researched on her own merits, with a special focus on the pivotal question of the relation between sentimentality and rationality. In this presentation, I hope to make clear some of the links we may observe between her epistemology, anthropology, and view on moral sentimentalism.

## **Knowledge of Disability and Disabled People's Knowledge**

*Caroline Harnacke (Tilburg University)*

To judge whether to prevent the birth of a disabled child, what the limits of gene modification are (if any), and what society owes to disabled people, we need an understanding of what it means to have a disability. Bioethics, and applied ethics in general, require not only moral principles and empirical facts, but also knowledge about specific experiences. I want to find out how to acquire knowledge of such experiences and how this knowledge relates to ethical and anthropological questions. Specifically, I will argue that disabled people have a duty to share their personal experiences of their situation.

## **Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues: Redux**

*Peter Hawke (University of Amsterdam)*

I re-evaluate the challenge posed to Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) by the missed clue counter-examples of Schaffer [2002]. Its import has been underestimated: certainly, Schaffer's specific argument invites distracting objections. But more forceful and precise arguments are nearby. I offer a novel formalization of RAT, accommodating a suitably wide class of RA theories. I

introduce the notion of an abstract missed clue counter-example and prove that every RA theory admits such a counter-example. This forms a precise argument (in Schaffer's spirit) that resists easy dismissal: the RA theorist can respond only with an error theory about certain intuitive epistemic judgments.

## **Finding Its Place: Non-Ideal Political Philosophy and the Contemporary World**

*Colin Hickey (Utrecht University)*

In this paper I aim to make progress understanding the project of so-called “non-ideal” political philosophy, such that it provides real value-added with respect to the task it sets itself. Motivated by worries about “ideal” theory, non-ideal theorists have tried to provide a countermeasure that is more directly aimed at providing normatively defensible action guidance, in our world. However, I suggest that for non-ideal theory to culminate the break from ideal theory, we still need a fairly radical reconception. Drawing on an extended analogy with bioethics, I suggest this will include a significant opening up of the field across disciplines.

## **Spinoza’s Omne Esse and Certainty**

*Tomoko Higuchi (Erasmus University Rotterdam)*

Spinoza demonstrates the existence of God in E1P11 from its nominal definition. However, it is unclear why and how a being deduced from a nominal definition can be real. This presentation will show that the concept of God is what Spinoza calls omne esse (the total being) and this gives certainty to it. First, we will discuss the concept of omne esse in the Treatise of Emendation of the Intellect and the Ethics. Subsequently, referring to Spinoza’s theory of true idea, we will conclude that such an idea cannot be false since it has no exclusion.

## **A Historical Challenge for Moral Realism**

*Jeroen Hopster (Utrecht University)*

Michael Huemer (2016) has recently presented empirical evidence in support of the thesis that over the course of human history, there has been a global shift in moral values towards a broadly ‘liberal’ orientation. Huemer argues that this shift better accords with a realist than an antirealist metaethics: it is best explained by the discovery of mind-independent truths through intuition. I argue, contra Huemer, that the historical data are better explained when assuming an antirealist metaethics. Huemer’s realist view does not fit the data as well as he suggests, whereas antirealists have underappreciated resources to explain the relevant historical dynamics.

## **Brentano on Russell's Paradox**

*Carlo Ierna (Radboud University Nijmegen)*

In 1909, prompted by the correspondence with his student Hugo Bergmann, Franz Brentano wrote a short treatise on Russell's Paradox. I will discuss Brentano's analysis and proposed solution of Russell's Paradox as well as the reception of his interpretation. Brentano moves several criticisms to Russell, both internal and external: how can something be an object and a class at the same time? How can "classes" be said to exist and literally have properties? At best we can only improperly predicate something of a class, which would make Russell's Paradox meaningless when taken literally.

## **Conceivability Arguments and the Overgeneration Problem**

*Savvas Ioannou (University of St Andrews, Scotland)*

Chalmers (1996, 2011) argued that ideal primary positive conceivability entails possibility. He claimed that phenomenal zombies are conceivable this way and thus, they are possible. Therefore, physicalism about phenomenal properties is wrong. However, I will argue that this conceivability argument faces the overgeneration problem. That is, the kind of reasoning suggested by this conceivability argument can be used to claim that a variety of concepts (including waterish concepts) refer to non-physical entities. The proponent of the conceivability argument faces a dilemma. Either s/he continues using it and endorses an abundant property dualism or rejects it because of its absurd conclusions.

## **Uncertainty in Science: A Study on the Role of Non-Cognitive Values in the Assessment of Inductive Risk**

*Silvia Ivani (Tilburg University), Matteo Colombo (Tilburg University) and Leandra Bucher (University of Wuppertal)*

Scientific research often involves uncertainty. In such cases, scientists may make mistakes, such as accepting a hypothesis that is actually false. Philosophers call the chance of being wrong when assessing hypotheses inductive risk and argue that it shows the beneficial role of non-cognitive values in science. Scientists can legitimately consider non-cognitive values if a mistaken assessment of hypotheses involves bad consequences, such as killing people. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between reasoning, inductive risk, and non-cognitive values. We present an experimental study clarifying the impact of non-cognitive values on the assessment of hypotheses in cases of inductive risk.

## **Vulcan, the golden mountain, and the man without properties: neo-Frege meets neo-Meinong**

*Bjorn Jespersen (Utrecht University)*

I show how my neo-Fregean theory solves three problem cases that are variations of the sentence “The F is an F”. The novelty is a notion of individuals-in-hyperintension. These are fine-grained modes of presentation of individuals-in-intension, serving to model ‘impossible individuals’, which are, naively speaking, individuals that could not possibly exist. Individuals-in-hyperintension are required for the third problem case, whereas standard individuals-in-intension suffice for the first two. My theory is Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic, which will be compared against the neo-Meinongian theories of Zalta’s object theory and Priest’s modal Meinongianism.

## **Explanation and Agency: Exploring the normative landscape of the “Right to Explanation”**

*Fleur Jongepier (Radboud University Nijmegen) and Esther Keymolen (Tilburg University)*

Suppose an algorithm makes a decision that has significant consequences for your future or daily life, like getting a mortgage. Intuitively, the least you’re entitled to is an explanation of why that particular decision was made. The new European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) includes a so-called ‘right to explanation’ in situations involving automatic decision-making. In this paper, we explore the normative landscape surrounding the right to explanation. We consider both a metaphysical approach that grounds such a right in a ‘human versus machine’-distinction, and a normative one in terms of the necessary epistemic conditions for deliberative agency.

## **Epistemic Dimensions of Environmental (In)Justice**

*Jason Kawall (Colgate University, United States)*

Empirical research suggests that our physical environment has striking impacts upon our cognitive development and performance. Studies show that excessive noise, heat, proximity to highways, and other factors have severe detrimental impacts on cognition. Globally, impoverished and marginalized communities face these issues disproportionately. In this paper I review some of the relevant empirical work, and argue that the issues raised ought to be of significant interest to epistemologists. Such work draws attention to new ways of thinking concerning the significance of embodied cognition, new ways of addressing situationist worries raised for virtue epistemologies, and alternative ways of improving epistemic performance

## **Considerations for Moral and Fulfilling Work**

*Sujin Kim (University of Twente)*

Work has developed in a polarized way in terms of technological innovation, but also in terms of meaning. Polarisation in economic results are coupled by polarisation of meaning between lovely and lousy jobs. Presenting a case of platform based work environment, the paper presents important considerations to the argument of meaningful work - a human need to experience, evaluate, and cultivate. With a bigger aim to critique on this, a smaller aim is to discuss the technological aspects of enhancement and meaningfulness. After introducing the argument on meaningfulness, I show the challenges to improve the meaningfulness of freelance work in platform economy. The lens of human-technology relations or mediation is useful because it makes visible the role of the platform and the entities in the world that affects the character of work.

## **Identifying Self-fulfilling Prophecy in Automated Prediction**

*Owen King (University of Twente) and Mayli Mertens (University of Twente)*

A self-fulfilling prophecy is a prediction that somehow increases the likelihood of its own truth. In this paper we offer a thorough account of self-fulfilling prophecies and their significance. First, we distinguish three types of self-fulfilling prophecies. Second, we describe two conditions that are both necessary for a prediction to be self-fulfilling and further explain why some are. Third, we show that our analysis provides fruitful explications of instances of self-fulfillment in important contexts of prediction: prediction of a person's preferences and prediction (prognostication) of medical outcomes. We pay special attention to automated prediction, especially machine-learning-based data analytics.

## **Depolarizing Theory and Practice: What Might Constitutivism about Political Norms be?**

*Tim Klaassen (Tilburg University)*

Constitutivist approaches to normativity seek to derive the authority of normative claims from the nature of action and agency. These theories, however, have been mostly concerned with the nature of moral norms and individual agency. But what about political norms and collective agency? If these are *sui generis*, then perhaps it is possible to formulate a political constitutivism. In this paper I offer a suggestion of what such a theory might look like. The thesis that I develop is that the source of political normativity lies in the interpretive capacities that people exercise in making sense of their socio-political order.

## **The Logic of Free Choice Permission**

*Johannes Korbmacher (Utrecht University) and Albert Anglberger (Bayreuth University)*

In this paper we develop a logic of permission with the free choice permission principle as its sole deontic axiom. We further provide a natural semantics in terms of truthmakers, and show that our logic does not contain any of the paradoxical consequences typically associated with free choice permission.

## **Indigenous tourism, recognition, and wellbeing**

*Matthias Kramm (Utrecht University)*

Can indigenous tourism be a positive factor for the wellbeing of indigenous peoples? There exist three different criticisms of such tourism projects: Firstly, the economic criticism that the income of indigenous tourism does not empower indigenous peoples, but rather enriches third parties. Secondly, the ecological criticism that indigenous tourism causes more harm to the environment than can be made up for by using the acquired resources. And thirdly, the cultural criticism that the staging of cultural tradition for outsiders is inauthentic. In this paper, I will defend the normative view that indigenous tourism can nevertheless contribute to indigenous wellbeing

## **How epistemic injustice can deepen disagreement**

*Thirza Lagewaard (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)*

I want to contribute to a better understanding of ‘deep disagreement’ by arguing that sometimes, disagreements are deepened due to epistemic injustice. I review the literature on the nature of deep disagreements. Then, I explore a case of deep disagreement: the debate in the Netherlands about racism. I argue that this dispute on racism should be understood as a deeper disagreement, because there is disagreement about what counts as evidence for the claim that racism is a significant issue in the Netherlands, due to both testimonial injustice (dismissal of expert testimony) and hermeneutical injustice (no uptake of relevant epistemic resources).

## **Falsifying generic stereotypes**

*Olivier Lemeire (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)*

Generics are generalizing statements that are not explicitly quantified, like “Dogs bark” or “Birds fly”. The truth-conditions of these statements have puzzled researchers for decades. Recently, a proposal by Sarah-Jane Leslie has become very popular. Her proposal explicitly aims to account for the troubling aspects of

generic stereotypes, like “Muslims are terrorists” or “Black people are lazy”. In this paper, I argue that there are several counter-examples to Leslie’s proposal. I propose a different set of truth-conditions that does allow us to falsify generic stereotypes.

## **The Extensional Constitution View**

*Martin Lipman (Leiden University)*

According to the constitution view, a lump of clay is distinct from the statue that is crafted out of the clay. This is generally taken to conflict with classical mereology. Classical mereology accepts an extensionality principle according to which distinct objects cannot have the same parts. Adherents of the constitution view typically assume that the statue and the clay have the same parts (and are nevertheless distinct), so that we appear to have a counterexample to the extensionality principle. In this talk I will explore a relatively neglected alternative: namely that the statue and the co-located lump are distinct objects but do not share any parts. I will introduce the extensional constitution view in some detail and defend it against potential worries.

## **Against Kantian Moral Relativism**

*Sem de Maagt and Rutger Claassen (Utrecht University)*

Recently, several authors who identify themselves as Kantians also identify themselves as moral relativists (Velleman 2015; Flikschuh 2017). Kantian moral relativism combines the Kantian idea that morality is grounded in the first-person perspective of an agent, with the moral relativist idea that there are different conceptions of agency and therefore different (correct) moralities. In this paper, we argue that any conception of agency presupposes a more fundamental form of agency which is necessary to make behaviour truly our own, and that this fundamental conception of agency is sufficiently thick to form the basis of a substantive, universal morality.

## **Can a Robot be a Good Colleague?**

*Sven Nyholm (Eindhoven University of Technology) and Jilles Smids (Eindhoven University of Technology)*

There are people who treat robots they work alongside in ways that suggest that they value these robots as they might value good human colleagues. Similarly, there are people who want to have robots as their friends or romantic partners. Philosophers of technology have discussed whether robots can be our friends or

our romantic partners, but not whether robots can be good colleagues. In this presentation, I will discuss the question whether robots could be good colleagues. In doing so, I will compare this question to the questions of whether robots can be our friends or romantic partners.

## **Human Rights and Motivation**

*Jos Philips (Utrecht University)*

This paper discusses what I call the motivational challenge to human rights: can human rights be effectively enforced in societies – also across generations and in acceptable ways? Human rights may be unsuitable as a global moral ideal if they cannot; but I argue that they ultimately can. More precisely, I hypothesize that when people are secure in their very important interests being met, they will not actively violate human rights nor support institutions or people who do. This may, if there is also an avant-garde of professionals and citizens, be enough to uphold a human-rights realizing society across generations.

## **Post-Truth Politics as Collective Gaslighting**

*Natascha Rietdijk (Tilburg University)*

Ever since the 2016 US presidential election, journalists, scientists and philosophers have sought to understand the phenomenon known as post-truth politics. However, the question that has remained underexplored is, what the implications of this political rhetoric are for epistemic agency. I will argue that post-truth politics are best understood as a form of grand-scale gaslighting. It manipulates victims' trust and self-trust to epistemically isolate them. I conclude that both gaslighting and post-truth politics aim do not just violate, but aim to systematically erode their victims' epistemic autonomy.

## **Nudges and Freedom**

*Philip Robichaud (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)*

Nudges are policy tools that governments and private parties can use to predictably influence our choices. A crucial question is whether nudges impact our freedom? Proponents of 'libertarian paternalism' claim that they don't. In this paper, I propose answers to the following questions: (1) Do nudges that target heuristics and biases make us unfree in some way or to some degree? (2) Even if we grant that nudged agents are by and large free, do nudges affect the value of the exercise of their agency? In other words, do we have axiological reasons to prefer non-nudged exercises of our agency?

## **Unleashing Moral Progress**

*Hanno Sauer (Utrecht University)*

Standard evolutionary explanations seem unable to account for inclusivist shifts that expand the circle of moral concern beyond strategically relevant cooperators. Recently, Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have argued that this shows that evolutionary conservatism – the view that our inherited psychology imposes significant feasibility constraints on how much inclusivist moral progress can be achieved – is unjustified. Secondly, they hold that inclusivist gains can be sustained, and exclusivist tendencies curbed, under certain favorable socio-economic conditions. I argue that Buchanan and Powell concede too much to the evolutionary conservative, because their second point shows that conservatives are right about the first: inclusivist shifts are unrealistic where it matters most, namely under harsh social, political and economic conditions. I suggest two promising strategies for solving this problem. One is to focus on different forms of moral progress to secure the same moral gains. The other is to look beyond possible extensions of our psychological capacities altogether, by providing institutional support that renders them irrelevant. We should bypass, rather than further stretch, the constraints of our evolved psychology to make moral progress possible.

### **Can research on psychopathy settle the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism?**

*Joost Schreuder (University of Groningen)*

Whether and to what extent does research on psychopathy support or refute rationalist and sentimentalist theories of moral judgment? To address this question, I use causal graph theory to systematically assess the empirical support of two theories: the sentimentalist theory of Shaun Nichols (2002) and the rationalist theory of Heidi L. Maibom (2005). I conclude that currently available studies about psychopathy do not give us a reason to prefer one theory to another. Instead, evidence of another kind is needed: studies that examine the relation between performance on rational, affective and moral tasks.

### **The Good Life and Commitment: Complementary Components for an Agonistic Political Participation**

*Dennis Schutijser (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador)*

This paper seeks to bring together two essential components of an agonistic political deliberation in which the value of polarization is acknowledged from two points of view. Political deliberation requires both the personal capacity to formulate and maintain one's own ethical point of view, and the political

commitment to defend that ethical point of view. Both issues are worked out in a Neo-Aristotelian framework, with reference to the ethical conception of the good life, and the political conception of citizenship.

### **Robots in the workplace. Design choices and problematic responsibility ascriptions to human co-workers.**

*Jilles Smids (Eindhoven University of Technology)*

Robots enter the workplace, not only as a tool, but increasingly also as a collaborator with human workers. In robot design, several characteristics of the robots allow for some range or continuum of options from which designers can choose. For example, a humanoid versus a machine-like appearance, one or more of various modalities of communication, etc. In this paper, I consider how such design choices can lead human co-workers to inaccurately perceive the robot's level of autonomy and competence. Subsequently I argue that problems with both forward- and backward-looking responsibility of human co-workers may result.

### **US and Them: The Ethics of AI Agents**

*Edward Spence (The University of Sydney, Australia)*

The paper will explore conditionally whether insofar as AI agents (AIAs) can develop autonomous intelligence similar to that of human beings they will have moral rights and moral obligations in the same way humans do at present. I will argue, that insofar as ethics universally prescriptive and species-transcendent and therefore not merely restricted to human beings alone then in principle AI agents would be bound by the same moral rights and obligations as humans. The paper will also explore the Control Problem whether AIAs can be bound and trusted to abide by rational but human ethical constraints.

### **Visualizations of interventionistic mental causation**

*Frank van Caspel (Open University of the Netherlands & Radboud University Nijmegen)*

Recently several authors have claimed that James Woodward's interventionistic theory of causality can solve the causal exclusion problem in philosophy of mind. Michael Baumgartner has convincingly argued that these claims are misguided. Markus Eronen, however, introduces a version of interventionism that prevents the causal exclusion problem, and which simultaneously offers a way of dealing with causal claims in the context of conceptual plurality. To explain the distinguishing feature of Eronen's of interventionism, and to highlight its benefits, I use a novel approach: causal graphs that include visualizations of the variable sets over which causal claims range.

## **Wellbeing, experience, and the significance of sentience**

*Willem van der Deijl (Tilburg University)*

Can a person's degree of wellbeing be affected by things that do not enter her experience? Experientialists deny this claim. The debate about this position has focused on an argument against experientialism – the experience machine objection – but little arguments exist for it. I present an argument for experientialism, which I call the Significance of Sentience argument. The argument is based on the premise that only sentient beings possess wellbeing, welfare sentientism. I argue that welfare sentientism can only adequately be explained by experientialist accounts of wellbeing, other accounts will leave unexplained why experience has this significant demarcating role.

## **Elusive Knowledge Hyperintensionalized**

*Janneke van Lith (Utrecht University)*

In “Elusive Knowledge” (Lewis 1996), Lewis lays out his relevant alternatives theory of knowledge ascriptions. One problem for this theory is that it doesn't work in hyperintensional contexts, which is odd since as, Schaffer points out, “epistemology is evidently a hyperintensional topic” (Schaffer 2015, 478). In this paper, we develop a hyperintensional version of Lewis's relevant alternatives theory in the framework of exact truthmaker semantics, which has recently been championed by Fine and others (Fine 2017).

## **The Bio-Based Economy: Philosophical Reflections on the Relation between the Biosphere and the Economic Sphere and their Consequences for Sustainable Practice**

*Roel Veraart (Wageningen University) and Vincent Blok (Wageningen University)*

Today, society faces serious environmental challenges. In order to mitigate climate change, the EU invests into initiatives such as the Bio Based Economy (BBE). We investigate the BBE's conceptuality regarding the relation between economy and ecology from a philosophical perspective (Levinas, Stiegler). We argue that by attempting to combine linear economy with ecological solutions as if these two spheres could be completely coalesced, the BBE preserves problematic tendencies from the past. Our hypothesis is that the effort to make our economy bio-based should recognise a principal polarization between human happiness and the biosphere itself.

## **Hamilton's rule: understanding the disagreement about its explanatoriness**

*Philippe Verreault-Julien (Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics) and Vaios Koliotakis (Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics)*

More than half of a century since its initial development, inclusive fitness theory and Hamilton's Rule (HR) remain controversial in evolutionary biology. We argue that the distinctions between how-possibly and how-actually explanations, on the one hand, and between causal and mathematical explanations, on the other hand, illuminate the source of the disagreement between the critics of HR and its supporters. Beyond illuminating the source of the disagreement over HR, an important benefit of using these distinctions is that they allow to temper both camps in their evaluation of whether HR affords understanding.

## **What Business Ethics can do for Applied Philosophy**

*Thomas Wells (Tilburg University)*

I argue that organisations should be taken more seriously by philosophers concerned with societal problems, from 'Fake News' or racial inequality. At present there is a tendency to focus at the level above (the justice of laws) or below (individual ethics). Yet a philosophical analysis of Fake News in terms of bad faith speakers or principles of free expression would be seriously incomplete without considering the choices of a handful of major social media companies to adopt a particular (advertising based) business model. Insights and concepts from business ethics are an underused resource for such problems.

## **Having a Good: the curious case of plants**

*Sander Werkhoven (Utrecht University)*

For certain entities, the world is polarized into things that are good, bad, or evaluatively neutral – these are the kind of entities that 'have a good'. Christine Korsgaard has argued that all living beings have a good, given their functional make-up and the fact that they can perceive things as being good and bad for them. This raises the question whether plants have a good, as no sensory perception can be presumed in plants. I will argue that plants do have a good, and that central parts of Korsgaard's meta-normative position will therefore have to be rejected.

## **A reconstruction and an assessment of Yessenin-Volpin's ultra-intuitionism**

*Takahiro Yamada (Utrecht University)*

I will analyse important notions of Yessenin-Volpin's ultra-intuitionism and the mathematics based on it, and argue that this standpoint should be located between Dummett's intuitionism and Wright's strict finitism. Researchers tend to classify Yessenin-Volpin's view as the conceptual source for the 'strict finitism' research tradition, since Dummett criticised 'strict finitism' and Wright attacked Dummett in favour of 'strict finitism'. But I will attempt to reveal that the standpoint Dummett and Wright had in mind was not Yessenin-Volpin's itself. In so doing, I will argue that Yessenin-Volpin's mathematics is not as 'feasibilist' as it may appear.

# Extended Abstracts in Order of Presentation (Symposium)

## Symposium I.1

### Divided Views and Divided Methods

*Sujin Kim (University of Twente) and Petko Karadechev (Aalborg University, Denmark)*

A study group was formed to discuss various approaches to Ethics of emerging technologies in health care. The study group used various angles of comparison to discuss both techno-anthropology and empirical bioethics, as well as mediation theory that seems to be useful to accommodate differences between the two and clarify the shared goals. Therefore, polarization of methodologies concerned the original problem between descriptive and normative ethics which the two approaches have already attempted to address. Polarization, however, also refers to the challenges to understand each other's' approaches. Difference in priorities of ethical analysis will be analyzed in the symposium. This exercise deepens our understanding of Techno-anthropology, bioethics, and philosophical anthropology in general. We will benefit from our discussion if we can discuss shared goal of both lenses, while we understand better the role of technologies as well as the role of critical reflection. Upon our previous experiences of learning-by-doing workshops, many students became aware of the diversity of approaches to critically discuss issues in emerging technology.

#### **Contribution 1: Critical Bioethics and a Nuanced View Proposed**

Understanding emerging technologies involve anticipating the potentials for technical and moral change. It also involves theorizing on the problems and solutions, especially on ethical issues. Therefore, the study group gained knowledge on how to analyze technological designs, participatory design efforts, as well as negotiations and governance efforts to appropriate these practices. Although this could involve a view on large array of practices, rather than focusing on specific area of practice that involves ethics (such as design), there is a clear advantage of having a holistic view. We can acknowledge the interconnection between these practices, we can also deepen our understanding on methodologies because many of them promise to provide insight on several or all of these areas. Our discussion of these two angles - anthropological ethics and philosophical ethics - will highlight strong and weak points of each perspective, also from the differences on methods and selection of cases.

The symposium compares techno-anthropology and empirical bioethics. What is at stake in our discussion are moral negotiation and moral innovation in the interfaces of human-technology relations. Theoretically, we try to articulate on the model that techno-anthropology students devised on assessment of technology. This will be used in the assessment of technologies in healthcare. Methodologies share the understanding on human-technology relations and the role of practice on shaping of norms. Original problem between descriptive and normative ethics might have been resolved from the approaches we looked into, empirical bioethics and anthropology. Polarisation in our discussion is addressing the different understandings of priorities when invoking, creating and applying ethical analysis. Indeed, the challenges persist when we attempt to understand each other's approaches or when we set out for a new assessment model. Regarding theory and practice balance, we would like to inquire the role that ethnography plays in the models of assessment. Regarding innovation, we inquire the potential of bioethics in emerging technology, deepening our understanding on the anticipation. or for technical and moral change. It also involves theorizing on the problems and solutions, especially thinking about ethical solutions neither precautionary and anticipatory. Between ethical theories of inter-disciplinary character, we human-technology relations. This exercise deepens our understanding of theories, or theories in philosophical anthropology in the broadest sense. The group aim to gain knowledge on how to analyse technological designs, participatory design efforts, as well as negotiations and governance efforts to appropriate these practices.

Well-informed anticipations were at play in the experiment of morality in emerging technology, for instance in an experiment of google glass users (Verbeek and Kudina 2018) the users or designers were not free from built in effects or matters of concern. Ethical issues of privacy for instance in legal and corporate formulation stems from lack of control of information rather than an issue of multiplied self (multidimensional bodies) and uncoordinated sharing of information between them. Critical question to the mediation approach is the political importance of this angle. For bioethics research to deliver such argument of intervention from better view of moral change, either enhanced or degraded. And this has to be justifiable from the society at large from its democratic values. So, to which extent does macro-mediation of morality come into effect could be a question that determines moral agency (individual or social group) Hence, we have a nuanced view on the built-in effects of technologies on societal and normative frameworks by looking closely into our 'concerns' and 'built in effects' (privacy, sustainability e.g.) that strongly shape our anticipation of techno moral effects. If meaningful relations with emerging technologies is the new concern, this is more hermeneutic and practice-based.

## ***Contribution 2: Model for Assessment of Technology (extension of Soft Edges of the Hardcore Technology)***

The talk presents a techno-anthropological approach to emergent values of the good lives in bioethics. A research framework for emergent values in relation to bioethical questions regarding emergent technologies is proposed. In fact, enhancing human capabilities concerns an important goal. Our approach originates in a critique of current bioethics, which primarily focuses on moral right or wrong judgements based on universal ethical principles. We instead propose a bioethical focus on what we call the good lives and virtue ethics, based on Nicomachean Ethics. We emphasize the individual level and the investigation of embodied rather than universal values and how these evolve in relation to technology. We combine Børsen (2013, 2015), Berthelsen, Nøhr and Botin (2015). Institutional and societal macro levels are included as these should stand on the insights gained at the individual level. The approach offers a way to investigate value change in regards to the good lives. Opposed to current bioethics that focuses on clarity, this approach will open the door to pluralism, ambiguity and experienced values.

### **Symposium II.1**

#### **Concerning the self**

*Bas de Boer (UT), Jonne Hoek (UT) and Jan Bergen (UT)*

In the tradition of 20th century continental philosophy we have seen a gradual decentering of the human subject. The human subject does no longer appear as an autonomous agent that can be considered the locus of freedom and reflection, and the beginning and end of all meaningful action. Instead, it has been argued that the human subject is actually shaped within power relations (Foucault 2005), as it only comes into being through contingent assemblages (Deleuze & Guattari 1987). Contemporary philosophers of technology of the continental persuasion have largely followed suit. They too reject any a-priori, transcendental ground for human subjectivity, and see the self and subjectivity constituted only in relational ontologies, either symmetrically bound in networks of actants (Latour 2005), or else mediated by technologies (Verbeek 2005). Clearly, the human self does no longer appear as the stable entity that can shape its own development. When uncritically embraced, the mentioned perspectives seduce one to view the human self as essentially deprived of its subjectivity. What remains is little more than a cog in the machinery of society, of technology, of biology. In this symposium, however, we will challenge this all too hasty interpretation and restore a legitimate, philosophical concern for the self. We simply cannot dismiss the fact that we human beings remain concerned with our selves. We try to get to know our selves through technologies, engage ethically with other selves, and are challenged to create new forms of subjectivity in view of technological developments. Haven't

we too easily dismissed important insights about human subjectivity that can be found in transcendental philosophical approaches? Or how else do we acknowledge that human subjectivity is indeed always shaped by the things it is surrounded with (e.g., technologies) and the situation from which it develops (e.g., socio-political structures, biological determinants)? What stronger notions of the self, or subjectivity are compatible with current philosophy of technology? These questions will be addressed along three lines: (1) subjectivity and ethics, (2) subjectivity and science, and (3) subjectivity and existential limits: (1) By discussing how understanding subjectivity as constituted through a Levinasian form of responsibility allows for developing an ethical ground for self-development and action. 2 (2) How subjectivity can engage with research in the cognitive neurosciences to be able to critically relate to the biological and neurological processes it finds itself being steered by. (3) By showing how postphenomenological theories of technological mediation conceptualize human-technology relations as existential relations and so picture the human self as a process of continuous self-reinvention.

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### ***Contribution 1: The Responsible Self: A Levinasian human(ism)for mediation theory***

In philosophy of technology, mediation theory is an amodern approach to the study of humantechnology relations. As such, it eschews strict subject/object dichotomies and modern humanism (whether based on biological essence or a human monopoly on agency)(e.g., Verbeek, 2005, 2011). Rather, intentionality and agency are seen as hybrid affairs in which humans and technologies partake together, thus doing away with the modern autonomous subject. Similarly, modern ethical theories will no longer do. Instead, Verbeek (2011) proposes an Foucaultian ethics of self-subjectivation. At first glance, this suggestion is somewhat puzzling in light of Ihde's (2003, p. 11) contention that post-phenomenology has substituted embodiment for subjectivity, rejecting the transcendentalist tradition from Descartes and Kant to Husserl, instead embracing MerleauPonty. The latter provides a foundation for the experiential or phenomenal self (as an alternative to different versions of the transcendental ego)(Zahavi, 2005) in the form of an embodied being-in-the(-technological)-world, which in turn provides the basis for the description of human-technology relations. However, in proposing the abovementioned ethics for mediation theory, Verbeek (2011) goes beyond

phenomenalselfhood which focuses on the mineness of experience. Inspired by Foucault, he adds a normativity-oriented, narrative conception of the self (Zahavi, 2005), living through technology and continually selfsubjectivating through embodied ‘technologies of the self’. For Foucault, subjectivation was a practice of freedom, leading to a critical ethics of resistance; an implication Verbeek does not wish to follow (he aims for constructive engagement rather than resistance). However, if it is not the spark of freedom that mobilizes subjects, what is left to fuel an ethics of selfsubjectivation? Mediation theory has yet to provide a satisfactory ethical foundation for subjectivation that is in line with its methodological, ontological or metaphysical assumptions (e.g., the primacy of experience, embodiment, human/technology co-constitution, etc). In this paper, I propose that part of such a foundation lies in the ‘model’ of selfhood implied in Emmanuel Levinas’ explicitly ethical phenomenology (e.g., Levinas, 1969, 1981). First, I show that it includes a) embodied being-in-the-world (i.e., enjoyment) as the origin of the phenomenal self, b) the birth of subjectivity in our responsibility to the infinite Other, and c) a narrative conception of the self, the continual reconstruction of which is demanded by justice. Secondly, I elaborate on the origin of subjectivity as responsibility, which has likely eluded mediation theory due to the latter’s tendency to ontologize (the appropriate question 4 being not what the subject is, but who). Thirdly, I explore the compatibility of this Levinasian conception of ‘self’ with mediation theory. This includes reflection on the role of technologies in the different ‘stages’ of the Levinasian Self and a reappraisal of transcendence and the ‘alterity’ relation. Interestingly, this Levinasian conception of subjectivity and selfhood opens up possibilities for a humanism based in radical passivity rather than a monopoly on agency, on alterity rather than sameness, on responsibility for others rather than biological genus or unbridled freedom (Levinas, 1987). This could possibly be the basis for a profoundly ethical, decidedly amodern, but nevertheless humanist foundation for mediation theory.

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### ***Contribution 2: ‘Existence’ in theories of technological mediation***

Postphenomenological theories of technological mediation conceptualize human-technology relations as existential relations. That catchword, ‘existential’, is rather vague though. Even if we agree that the word has something to do with the human

‘self’, its exact meaning is difficult to pin down, or even indefinable according to some philosophers. (Kierkegaard 1980) What is the function of this notion in the postphenomenological philosophy of technology? And what sort of human ‘self’ do such existential relations with technologies bring about? I will address these questions in three steps. First, I follow the positioning of the theory of technological mediation as an alternative to theories of technological extensionism and theories of humantechnology networks or power relations following Kiran & Verbeek (2010). Second, I will compare claims made about the changing nature of human existence due to technological developments against a more classically attuned Existenzphilosophie, namely that of Karl Jaspers. (Jaspers 2010) Third, I will compare and contrast two technologies that are said to mediate the existential self in novel ways. The analysis will reveal that the theory of technological mediation can be said to have a so-called ‘meta-modernist’ signature. (Vermeulen & van den Akker 2010) By alternating between the modern, and a-modern extremes of its contenders, it tries to formulate a new vantage point for positive engagement with technologies as structuring our vulnerability, possibilities, and trust. Trying to argue for the attainment of such a middle ground, however, the technological mediation theory forgoes claims of conceptual primacy and declaration of ultimate values or goals. Pragmatically oriented and empirically informed, its mode of analysis stays so to say ‘amidst of things’, in medias res. Thereby, the approach seems to evade precisely those issues that – according to Karl Jaspers at least – most notably bring about existential reflection: limits. I will argue, however, that such a conclusion might be premature. Reflecting on a technology as a new middle ground implicates on reflection that it brings along also new extremes. New limits, foundations, and goals can so appear, though not as long as these limits are assessed in abstract. Rather, it only is by engaging with new technologies, by actively putting our selves into the balance, that we might come to terms with our technologically mediated self. In this call for engagement lies the true existential challenge that this theory of technological mediation advocates.

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### ***Contribution 3: Critical Self-Identification: Human Subjectivity and the Cognitive Neurosciences***

Although we are tempted to think about the self in terms of a unified entity, current research in the cognitive neurosciences suggests that the realization of

different aspects of the self are not ‘governed’ by a unified agent – or can be traced back to an underlying substance (e.g., Gallagher 2013; Legrand & Ruby 2009). This reminds of Hume’s famous skeptical argument that ‘we are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions’ (Hume 1978 [1739- 40], 252). Even if we accept developments in cognitive neuroscience, or a Humean skepticism indeed invalidate every understanding of the self as an entity, they do suggest that there can be a position from which questions about the ‘self’ can be posed. In one way or another, it seems that it is possible to relate to one’s own neurophysiology, or to engage in a position that allows Hume to deny the existence of the self. In line with critical perspectives on the self in current (continental) philosophy, I suggest to call this process through which it becomes possible to question what it means to be a ‘self’ human subjectivity (e.g., Taylor 1989, 514). Contrary to how Hume and an idealized view of the cognitive neurosciences approach the self, this implies that this question is posed by embodied, interested subject that already has a certain interest in posing this question. In this paper, I explore how research in the cognitive neurosciences allows human subjectivity to ask questions about the ‘self’ and opens up possibilities for critical self-identification. Firstly, I show how the concept of critical self-identification can be used to show that human subjectivity does not need to coincide with the historical and socio-political structures that it finds itself relating to, but can be better understood as mediated by those structures (cf. Verbeek 2011). Secondly, I discuss how Catherine Malabou attempts to develop a notion of ‘plasticity’ that allows to establish a critical relation with our biology, and uses this notion to open up a space for self-reflection that does not necessarily need to coincide with societal demands (e.g., Malabou 2008, 11). Thirdly, I suggest that the concept of critical self-identification can be of help when exploring how current cognitive neuroscientific research using brain imaging technologies can help constituting forms of human subjectivity.

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## Symposium III.1

### *Politics & technologies of the city - “All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace: Liberal Democracy and the Smart City”*

*Michael Nagenborg (UT) Bart van Leeuwen (Radboud University) Marcel Muller (KRITIS - TU Darmstadt), and Ryan Wittinglow (University of Groningen)*

In his poem, “All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace”, Richard Brautigan proposes governance by machines. Instead of democracy, he writes, we will have a “cybernetic ecology” where animals and computer co-exist in “mutually programming harmony”. The cost of this service is but a small thing. We need only offer our liberty to Brautigan’s titular “machines of loving grace”.

Although it’s been a long time since 1967, the utopian impulse that the poem articulates—the notion that we will be fitter, happier, and more productive if we allow ourselves to be administered by intelligent machines—remains compelling. Within the domain of urban design and planning, this impulse has recently expressed itself in a suite of proposals concerning what is called the “smart city”: that is, using information and communication technologies to autonomously manage municipal systems with the aid of sensors and actuators managed by artificial intelligences. Pilot programs are already underway in a number of Dutch cities, including Eindhoven, Utrecht, and Assen. At least among philosophers, some of the flaws inherent in this view are well known. Machine learning algorithms possess politics just like any other artefact. The mere fact that these algorithms demonstrate some degree of autonomy by no means implies that they do not inherit the cultural and epistemic biases of their creators and users. There are, however, other concerns associated with optimising the panopticon. To that end, I will argue three things.

First, I will argue that liberal democracy is inherently, and necessarily, both slow and inefficient. This inefficiency is not a flaw. While the collectivist nature of liberal democracy means that decisions are almost always rendered less quickly than in authoritarian forms of rule, this very slowness helps guarantee that new policies and new behaviours are given sufficient deliberative scrutiny. It is upon these profoundly inefficient deliberative and aggregative procedures that the legitimacy of liberal democratic systems is premised. Second, I will argue that the introduction of smart systems into liberal democracies threatens the integrity of these procedural norms. Although the use of artificial intelligences to swiftly and opaquely replace deliberative decision-making processes could produce positive outcomes in certain domains, it also directly compromises the necessarily slow, methodical, and dull processes that typify liberal democratic governance. This, I argue, poses an indirect challenge to the legitimacy of both democratic decision-making and the legitimacy of the institutions that help constitute that decision-

making process. Third and finally I will argue that the predictive nature of smart systems abrades uncomfortably against liberal democratic justifiable norms such as the presumption of innocence, freedom of will, and notions of human dignity. Furthermore, decision-making artificial intelligences themselves pose a challenge to the rule of law, in that they cannot be subject to the laws they enforce. This, I claim, poses a profound challenge to the legal and political achievements upon which liberal democracy is premised.

## Symposium III.5

### *Inequality, Democracy and Property: Part Two*

*Michael Bennett (Utrecht University), Rutger Claassen (Utrecht University), and Yara al Salman (Utrecht University)*

A major source of contemporary polarization is the polarization of wealth holdings. The papers in these two panels explore what inequality means for democracy, freedom and the justification of property. The classical conception of a liberal-democratic society depends upon a clear split between the private and the public sphere. Ideally, political institutions protect public interests and private individuals/groups can freely pursue their private interests. However, contemporary interpenetrations of the private and public sphere render this claim hollow. Wealthy individuals and corporations influence politics through means such as selectively funding political parties and organs of public opinion. These panels investigate which normative criteria should be used to evaluate the influence of wealth on democratic institutions. Democratic theories often make idealising egalitarian assumptions, and the transition to non-ideal theory may necessitate re-thinking the foundations of democratic legitimacy and fairness. Even more than these abstract questions, however, we focus on what policies and institutions are required in the light of these reflections. In particular, is it feasible to insulate politics from economic inequality, or is something more radical necessary? Are huge wealth holdings unacceptable as a standing threat to democracy, freedom, and autonomy? If so, what can be done about them? These panels explore various aspects of this under-appreciated political rationale for policies to promote greater economic equality. Beyond this, we also question whether the structure of classical liberal ownership itself needs to be amended to make room for democratic equality. Should shareholders be compelled to share control over firms with their workers? What would the structure of property look like if we paid more attention to the opportunities people actually have rather than formal rights against non-interference? And finally, if the idea of the public-private divide should be attenuated, should we move away from individualistic, contractarian models of the justification of property itself? This pair of panels will be relevant to all those interested in these topical questions at the intersection of economic justice and democratic theory.

## *Contribution 1: How to Argue for Workplace Democracy*

Many are troubled by the apparent contradiction between our commitment to democracy in the state, and the hierarchical conditions prevailing in most workplaces. This paper critiques the standard philosophical argument for state promotion of workplace democracy, and then sets out what a more convincing argument would look like. The most popular philosophical argument for promoting workplace democracy has been the “parallel case” between workplace and state. 1 Implicitly or explicitly, these arguments rely on the assumption that, when workplace democracy is made compulsory or subsidised, states thereby confer a benefit on workers. However, this assumption will not hold. If the state starts to require the inclusion of workplace democracy in labour contracts, we cannot expect other aspects of the contracts to remain the same. Unless the underlying balance of supply and demand is changed, employers will predictably offset the workplace democracy requirement by reducing other benefits workers receive – most obviously, salaries. In the end, workers are unlikely to derive greater net benefit from their jobs by insisting that shared control over the firm is always among the benefits they receive. It is easy to overlook that the current regime already allows people to join worker-run firms, and these predominate in particular sectors of the economy, such as law or accountancy.<sup>2</sup> Overriding the apparent preferences of workers in other parts of the economy is unlikely to best promote their welfare. A sound case for promoting workplace democracy is therefore unlikely to be found in the welfare of the individual workers who thereby gain a share of control over their firms. Instead, we should focus on potential benefits to other stakeholders in society. Two general categories of moral failure afflict business life. 3 On the one hand, managers are tempted to exploit their knowledge and power when it comes to intra-firm agency relations with investors and workers. On the other, the firm as a whole is tempted to exploit market failures with its customers, suppliers and neighbours. Against the first problem, workers can help investors police managerial abuses through the first-hand knowledge they have of the firm. Against the second, workers are more embedded in the communities firms affect and so less likely to condone abusive behaviour. Ultimately, these are conjectures which require empirical investigation. However, they indicate the lines along which a satisfactory argument for promoting workplace democracy should run. There is nothing deeply significant about the employment relation per se; workers just happen to be well-positioned to hold business managers and investors to account. Promoting workplace democracy should thus be seen as part of a broader project of encouraging countervailing forces against overly powerful interests in society.

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## ***Contribution 2: Property and Positive Freedom***

Defenders of negative freedom have often argued in favor of strong private property rights, embodying a commitment to a minimal state and an extensive sphere of capitalist interactions between individual property-owners. Indeed, one highly influential liberal strand in political thought holds – following John Locke and others – that the legitimacy of the liberal state is based on its ability to protect the property of its citizens. Some contemporary libertarians even argue that rights to non-interference can basically be derived from the right to self-ownership. This paper will inquire what a defender of positive freedom should say about property. This link has had much less investigation than the relation between negative freedom and property. If one believes the legitimacy of the state depends on its ability to protect its citizens' abilities to exercise self-government (or their abilities to lead an autonomous life), what does this imply for the right to property? First, the paper introduces a definition of the ideal of positive freedom and its essential components and the link between positive freedom and property. Arguably positive freedom is most often used as a basis for justifying the provision of welfare state services, paid out of taxation. Hence, the link lies in positive freedom's ability to justify (coercive) taxation and redistribution to pay for services (like health care and education) which enhance citizen's individual autonomy. This arguably leaves the primacy of private property, which is so central to the negative freedom tradition within liberalism, intact. The remainder of the paper investigates the hypothesis that positive freedom cannot be linked so strongly to private property. Instead, the ideal may require different forms of property (communal property held by collectives, public or state property, and corporate property), depending on the circumstances. This hypothesis mirrors the economic point of view which allows for a diversity of property structures depending on what is most efficient, replacing however the idea of efficiency with the idea of positive freedom.

## ***Contribution 3: Starting from World Ownership: Stopping Anywhere***

Can theories of world ownership help us think about distributive justice? Left libertarians and some of their critics seem to think so. In developing their theories of justice, they do not start from people's needs, but from people's pre-institutional property rights to the world's resources. These theorists believe that, depending on what you take these original claims to be, you will arrive at different theories of justice (Fisher, 2015; Otsuka, 2003; Fabre, 2002; Van Parijs, 1997). There has been some debate about which world ownership theory can best make sense of our moral intuitions, both in terms of the starting point it describes and in terms of the principles of justice it arrives at (Risse, 2005). Meanwhile, critics argue that any such theory will have undesirable implications (Arneson, 2010; Cohen, 1995). Few, however, have questioned the very use of these theories as a device for doing political philosophy. This paper argues that world ownership theories do not help us to think about distributive justice. This is not because they lead to normatively

unattractive outcomes, but because they simply cannot do any normative work. The paper provides a clarification of world ownership theories, demonstrating that these theories can be used in two ways that are not adequately distinguished in the literature. The first is as a starting point for a bargaining position, the second is as a contemporary claim that individuals have. I also show that different existing conceptions of world ownership rely on ideas about property regimes that are incomplete and sometimes even incorrect. I improve these conceptions so that they fit better with actual property regimes and with bundle of rights property theory. I argue, however, that not even these conceptions can help us as a starting point to think about distributive justice. Once we have excluded unequal world ownership as a plausible starting position, any other original ownership thesis becomes indeterminate. The normative work is always done elsewhere and is independent of the starting point. I do suggest, however, that world ownership could be an attractive end point in a theory of justice. This would also be in line with functional theories of property.

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## Symposium IV.2

### *Contentious Embodiment*

*(Organized by: OZSW Study group Feminist Philosophy)*

*Annemie Halsema (VU), Nathanja van den Heuvel (Leiden University), and Sanne van Driel (Tilburg University)*

The proposed symposium is organized by the OZSW study group Feminist Philosophy. Feminist Theory is well-known for theorizing the body. The papers in this symposium will demonstrate the various ways in which embodiment is conceived of in feminist and critical theory. We will discuss ethnographical, phenomenological, neo-materialist and poststructuralist approaches to embodiment. We consider embodiment “contentious” in more than one sense. In the first place, the body is still underthematized in philosophy (for instance, in debates around personal identity). Within the history of Western thought the body has predominantly been conceptualized as belonging to the realm of nature, set apart from our rational faculties and therefore less worthy of serious philosophical

attention. In the second place, in those cases in which the body is thematized, embodiment most of the times is considered in a neutral and abstract way. Factors that in daily life are important for our sense of self - such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age and ability – are hardly ever accounted for. The proposed papers do consider these factors, and therewith contribute to the development of philosophical frameworks for understanding the relation between embodiment, subjectivity and identity. The focus on everyday life experiences is the last sense in which embodiment is contentious: thematizing embodiment implies bringing everyday practices to philosophical consideration. The individual papers thematize different aspects of embodiment, that are part of everyday practices: exercise, sports, sexuality . In paper 1, the general problem of the relation between embodiment and personal identity will be addressed. The paper aims at a notion of personal identity that takes into account intersectional factors that situate a person socially. Based on empirical research on the experiences of elite sports women, paper 2 reconsiders poststructuralist frameworks in sport and gender research and by drawing on the philosophy of play proposes an alternative framework for understanding the relation between discipline, subjectivity and agency. Paper 3 will discuss ideas about embodiment in relation to ‘mental health’, drawing on (auto)phenomenographic research on the practice of running therapy. It will reflect on the embodied position of a (feminist, crip) researcher in the field of mental healthcare, and propose to shift the research lens between embodied experiences and processes of abledment/ableism.

***Contribution 1: The socially situated self: intersectionality and personal identity***

Since the introduction of the notion of intersectionality in gender studies in the late eighties of the last century (Crenshaw 1989), it is seen as constitutive for personal identity. It is generally taken as an alternative for the single axis perspective of identity politics, because of its focus on the interrelation between gender, class, race, ethnicity and other social determinants (Crenshaw 1991; Yuval-Davis 2006). Intersectionality has been challenged for focusing too much on identity, while overlooking social structures and institutions (Yuval-Davis 2006), for considering a too strict notion of identity, that does not help overcoming identity politics (Grosz 2011), but also for considering identity too little (Staunæs 2003; Prins 2006). In all of these cases, the “identity” referred to primarily signifies one’s belonging to social groups on the basis of bodily characteristics. “Identity” pertains to the social determinants that situate the self, the so-called “intersectional axes” (Yuval-Davis 2006) or “crossroads” (Crenshaw 1989) that position the self socially. In this paper, I will argue that even though this is a relevant aspect of personal identity, it does not provide a complete account of it, and that theorizing intersectionality can gain from understanding personal identity in a fuller sense. Apart from what can be called the “idem”-aspect of personal identity, or whatness, that the intersectional factors pertain to, identity also has an “ipse”-aspect

(whoness) that characterizes someone as a person. It is precisely the latter aspect that constitutes experiential selfhood. In order to understand how self-esteem and self-respect are related to social determinants, such as gender, class, race, intersectionality theories need to consider both sides of identity. For a notion that combines these aspects, I suggest to turn to the philosophical debate over personal identity, more specifically to the narrative accounts of the self, developed in the nineties of the last century by Paul Ricoeur (1990) and Marya Schechtman (1996). The trouble is, however, that these philosophical accounts of the self do not thematize the social determinants of personal identity. While in daily life, factors such as gender, race, class for a large part constitute who we are, in most philosophical theories they are barely accounted for. The narrative notions of identity therefore need an extra dimension. In the last part of the paper, I will develop this alternative: the self as expression, that is embodied and that does take into account one's social situatedness. On this basis, personal identity will prove to pertain to subjective self-understanding as well as to the social structures that situate the self, and it will become understandable that these structures not only position us socially, but that we are also able to negotiate them.

### ***Contribution 2: Elite women sports and the limits of critique***

Towards a feminist playology The introduction of Marxist and poststructuralist social theory into the field of sport research has enabled critical sport studies to further think the relation between language, the body and the subject's inside. In modern sports, discipline is no longer applied from without, but internalized in such a way that the conformation to norms becomes the mode of self-realization. To be more precise, critical sport studies criticize modern sporting practices for treating the body of the athlete as inert matter that can be moulded, shaped, quantified and measured by sport data analysts, psychologists, trainers, physicians and dieticians. Focussing on identity constructions and the question of gender-normalization in relation to high performance sport, sport and gender studies complement these critiques by addressing the intimate relation between gender and techniques of control. Hence critical sport and gender research importantly show that despite the growth in media and public interest and increasing levels of support systems in the world of elite sports, oppressive gender norms and stereotypes still persist. However, based on extensive fieldwork - in-depth interviews with elite sports women and participant observation - this paper argues that a poststructuralist framework alone is not capable of making sense of the experiences of elite sports women, more philosophically put their place in the world. The experiences of the players as reflected on by themselves reveal that these 'objectivist' analyses cannot fully account for the players' willingness to sacrifice health, social life etc. For this willingness transcends elite sporting culture and its disciplinary techniques. Second, this paper argues that the missing aspect in critical sport and gender research to adequately account for players' willingness to sacrifice, must be understood as an element of play, or the 'playfulness' of sports.

Along with the categories of ‘gender policing’ and ‘high performance’ ‘playfulness’ must be considered a key structure of the experiences of elite sportswomen. Play here does not refer to a particular form of behaviour praised for its biological or psychological benefits nor to a certain attitude of the individual sports woman, or to the structures of the game as such. On the other hand, drawing on the work of the pre-rational play theorists, Johan Huizinga, Eugen Fink, Hans Georg Gadamer and Mihai I. Spariosu, in this paper play will be discussed as an embodied, affective experience that belongs to an ontological distinct category, i.e. a reality that surpasses the individual and temporarily suspends ‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ life. Thus third, this paper argues that the theorisation of the workings of gender, and high performance, should be complemented with a theoretical account of play. It is only by adding this third aspect that a comprehensive understanding of the structures of experience of elite sports women can be accounted for. Hence play makes visible that social constructivist and critical theoretical accounts of the workings of gender and disciplinary practices miss important insights about the structures of experience. The analysis of playfulness is however not independent of the analysis of gender or disciplinary practices. Therefore an account that is sensitive to playfulness will yield new insights about subjectivity, sexual difference and agency.

***Contribution 3: Being able to live a daily life? Embodiment and the process of abledment in the treatment of depression***

If according to the World Health Organization depression is the leading cause of ill health and disability worldwide (WHO 2017), it is to say that depression gets in the way of people’s daily functioning, causing not only suffering to individuals and their loved ones, but also, and not in the least, costing society a lot of money. Speaking from within this neoliberal health paradigm, the WHO presents the body as a resource from which to extract productive and successful living. When the body does not deliver, something needs to be done –whether it is to find the cause and cure, get psychological treatment or find a way to self-improve - to become healthy and able again. The dualisms ill/healthy and able/disabled, are only two of many dualisms structuring modern discourse –mind/body is another important one- following a divisive and excluding logic in which one is always on top of the other, some bodies more than others pushed to the margins of society. As disability scholar Fiona Kumari Campbell (2009) argues with Bruno Latour (1991), it is the modern division between able/disabled that allows for a process of translation from ‘disabled’ to ‘able’ to be set in motion. In other words: disability is the negative identity created to produce ableness. On an individual level this means, as Foucault showed in his work on disciplinary power and normalization, that to find oneself wanting, doing or being something society values negatively, makes one both develop a negative sense of self or identity and work harder to overcome this. It could be argued, as it is being done in critical disability and affect theory, that it is precisely the high prevalence of feelings of exhaustion, fatigue, dread, sadness, feelings of being stuck, not able to go on anymore – often labelled as

burn-out or depression – that points to the exhaustion of neoliberal capitalism and its disabling politics. On the level of personal experience however, this critical analysis hardly helps one in need of care, as a subject in society caught up in this ableist orientation. A bodily reorientation, to borrow from Ahmed's *Queer Phenomenology* (2006) or a focus on the materiality of bodies, as Campbell (2009) suggests, is needed to find a way out of disabling dualistic logic. This implies the affirmation of discomfort and unruliness 'spilling' from bodies labelled as ill or disabled, tuning in to the experiences of living bodies seeping through tight and suffocating mental health regimes. Furthermore, instead of pointing the gaze at labelled bodies from the assumption of health and ableness, Campbell proposes to shift the gaze. In line with Foucault's ethical-aesthetic imperative of freedom practices: to refuse who you are (to refuse identity), she refuses the notion of able(ness), and instead shifts her attention to processes of abledment. It is this tension between critical analysis of social-political structures (diagnosing society) and writing about and from personal embodied experiences (including internalised ableism and self-stigmatisation) that I will address in this paper. Drawing on my – ongoing- (auto)phenomenological research on the practice of running therapy as treatment for depression in the Netherlands, I propose to shift the research lens between embodied experiences and processes of abledment/ableism.

## Symposium IV.5

### **Foucault Philosopher: Twenty-First Century Perspectives**

*Michael Leezenberg (UvA), Michael Karskens (Radboud University), and Laure Bastiaans (UvA)*

The recently completed publication of Foucault's Collège de France lectures and the appearance of the fourth and final volume of the *History of Sexuality* provide the occasion for a new stocktaking of the philosophical relevance of this formidable French thinker. This symposium will focus on the philosophical dimensions of his work, rather than on its - equally important – historiographical or social-theoretical aspects. A first, and currently highly topical, philosophical dimension is Foucault's ongoing dialogue with Marxism. Against a number of recent reductionist analysis, it emerges that Foucault's 1979 lectures on neoliberalism cannot be assimilated to either a liberal narrative that accepts market forces as better warranting individual liberties than social democracy, or a Marxist narrative that takes the political economy to be methodologically primary. Crucially, for Foucault, class identities and class relations are mediated by power, and hence by knowledge; and the neoliberal conceptualization of free markets and individual liberty should be analyzed as a form of government. A second area of philosophical importance is Foucault's theoretization of power. Famously, Foucault introduced notions like discipline, biopolitics, and pastoral power as complements or alternatives to the hitherto dominant concept of sovereign power as state-

oriented, repressive, and expressed in the form of law. His own notions, however, raise new questions. For example, the notion of biopolitics was originally developed as a complement to discipline, and as a way of explaining commonalities in the twentieth century's two 'diseases of power,' viz., fascism and Stalinism; but Foucault never really elaborated on this term, thus leaving it unclear, for example, how it relates to more familiar theoretical studies of fascism and totalitarianism. Although the notion has opened up an entire field of study, we may – and as philosophers should – question its conceptual coherence, the more so as Foucault seems to have tacitly abandoned the notion in the course of his 1979 lectures. A third still largely unexplored area is Foucault's contact with and use of analytical philosophy. It is relatively well known that the notion of discursive practices owes much to Wittgenstein's account of language games and to Austin's and Searle's Speech Act Theory; but these links, fruitful as they may be for analytical philosophy, have hardly been explored, thematized, or elaborated. Thus, one wide open question is whether Foucault's genealogical approach to the concept of truth has anything to currently popular analytical and pragmatist views on truth, like Davidson's and Rorty's. Against these, Foucault's scattered remarks suggest a non-epistemic account of truth that pays far greater attention to aspects of conflict in knowledge and language than the analytical tradition does. This panel aims at addressing some of these questions, hoping to raise a renewed philosophical interest in Foucault's Protean, and still continuing, output.

### ***Contribution 1: Foucault and Analytical Philosophy: Towards a Genealogy of Truth***

Foucault's affinities with, and use of, analytical-philosophical ideas has often been noted but rarely been addressed in detail. The contacts between his approach to discursive formations and Austin's and Searle's Speech Act Theory is relatively well known; his use of Wittgenstein's notion of language games for understanding what he calls 'power games,' i.e., everyday practices of exercising power, have been studied rather less; and the relevance of his scattered remarks on truth for analytical have not, for as far as I am aware, been discussed in detail. In this contribution, I will therefore look at Foucault's sketchy remarks pointing to a genealogical perspective on truth, and discuss how this perspective contrasts with analyticalphilosophical (and in particular pragmatist) approaches like Davidson's and Rorty's. First, I will trace the history, or genealogy, of truth. Unlike a number of analytical philosophers, Foucault does not take assertions (i.e., declarative sentences that are at least potential bearers of truth conditions) as the most basic kind of statement. Moreover, he argues that truth is not a primitive notion but an effect of particular operations on statements (or, more generally, on sets of statements). In his published writings, he never developed a history of how truth became a central notion; but in his 1971 lectures at the Collège de France, he provides at least a sketch for such a genealogy of truth, discussing the notion of *alètheia* from archaic poets like Hesiod through the sophists to Aristotle's

discussion of apophantic statements, that is, assertions or truth-bearing statements or sentences. He is cautious to distinguish this historical sketch from Heidegger's famous characterization of truth as *Unvergessenheit*, arguing that the ancient notion of truth involves becoming rather than being, and in part precedes the metaphysical concern with being. In this, he appears to follow Nietzsche rather than Heidegger. Second, I look at the systematic implications of a genealogical perspective on truth. Foucault has often been blamed for allegedly giving up the belief in truth and in objectively valid knowledge; but it turns out that he precisely rejects this kind of skepticism. First, I will trace how Foucault appears to imply a non-epistemic account of truth, which reduces questions of truth and knowledge to something radically different, viz., a will to know. Next, I will briefly contrast this position with Davidson's and Rorty's. Like them, Foucault, appears to dissolve, or overcome, skepticism as a major philosophical problem; but unlike them, he does not think of truth in terms of usefulness and progress, but rather in terms of conflict. His position may therefore amount not so much to an epistemological skepticism concerning true statements but rather to, so to speak, a political mistrust of the concept of truth. I will conclude by discussing how this genealogical perspective on truth contrasts with a number of widespread analytical-philosophical assumptions concerning epistemology and the philosophy of language.

### ***Contribution 2: Bringing the State Back In: Neoliberal Rearticulations of Discipline***

Famously, Foucault develops an account of power that avoids thinking of power in purely negative terms of repression and/or distortion; he also tries to uncover modalities of power that cannot be characterized in terms of sovereignty; that is, they are not exercised in or by the state, and are not articulated in terms of laws. This presentation will explore whether and to what extent Foucault actually succeeds in going beyond the state, which at one point he calls a 'fiction' and a 'mythical abstraction'. Is perhaps the state more strongly implicated in nonsovereign forms of power than he is willing to admit? And if so, what does this imply for his accounts of, in particular, discipline and biopolitics? Discipline, according to Foucault, is a non-sovereign, productive form of power that is articulated and exercised not in terms of laws and transgressions but of the normal and the pathological. It is exercised not directly by the state; but it is generally exercised in institutions or spaces that have for a long time been the prerogative of the state, like schools, prisons, and hospitals. Foucault believed however that disciplining made way for more indirect ways of governing in modern western societies, with the emergence of American neoliberalism that according to him involved a crucial remaking of state, society and the self. The notion of biopolitics refers to an equally non-sovereign form of power, but which is totalizing rather than individualizing. The concept, however, more or less disappears from his work, when he focuses on current neoliberal government. This

talk will explore whether we face some recombinations of power modalities in today's western societies, that involve a more authoritarian type of state than Foucault's analysis allows for. Current forms of normalizing practices in present-day neoliberal societies can be fruitfully captured in terms of a 'neoliberal-statist' kind of discipline and biopolitics. I will focus on present-day neoliberal forms of normalization in the education system, through statesponsored and state-sanctioned forms of monitoring and screening.

### ***Contribution 3: Civil society as heterotopia and pastoral power***

It has often been noted that Foucault has at some moments been in a fruitful and productive dialogue with Marxist ideas, while at other moments rejected Marxism wholesale in a rather more polemical manner. The precise nature of his views on neoliberalism, by contrast, is currently still more controversial and more contested. This contribution will confront Foucault's conception of civil society with both Marxist and neoliberal ones. Foucault's discussion of civil society is the final part of his analysis of (neo-) liberalism. We will argue that his approach of civil society was based on a post-marxian counter-model of power, being an ongoing struggle (lutte), and on Christian model of pastoral power, being an ongoing group process of individualizing subjection and subjectivation. From the point of view of counterconduct, civil society is a continuous opposition to state and government, to class struggle, and to neo-liberal individualism. This approach opens up an alternative framing of civil society, which was already offered by Foucault himself in his essay on Heterotopias. Our proposition is that Civil Society reconstructed as a political heterotopia offers a more powerful conception of civil society as open society and unlimited glocal or metatopical space in which 'subjects' do not act as *homines economici*, but as publicprivate group members. From the point of view of pastoral power, civil society is the modernized version of a church, as an accumulation of (local) non-family communities in which social ties are neither based on explicit contracts, nor on voluntary association, but on a serial of "disinterested interests". The (pastoral) power in that community is "spontaneously" shaped in concrete, here and now, subjection and subjectivation practices. I will conclude by comparing and contrasting this conception of civil society with currently dominant (neo-) liberal and Marxist accounts.

### ***Contribution 4: Foucault and Neoliberalism: Between Transgression and Resistance***

Since the English translation of 'The Birth of Biopolitics' first appeared in 2008, Michel Foucault's philosophical engagement with neoliberalism has been an object of intense debate. Taking Foucault's analysis of the reconfiguration of neoliberal human capital theory and its rhetoric of individual self-enhancement as central theme, we will argue that Foucault's discussion of the neoliberal subject, practices and discourses cannot be understood without taking into account his concept of resistance. Starting with his earlier work on transgression and contestation, we will

follow Foucault's trajectory of thought regarding his thoughts of resistance and emphasize recurring themes such as the decentralization of the subject, his refusal to define any limits to resistance, and his persistent critique of any notion of resistance in dialectical, revolutionary and/or emancipatory terms. By linking these concepts to his lectures on neoliberalism, we will demonstrate that Foucault's writings on resistance can be used to stake a critical position against the neoliberal narrative of the subject and its failure to recognize the shifting border between selfenhancement and self-effacement as well as the humanistic grounds on which such a theory is based. I will contrast this position with more familiar liberal and Marxist images of neoliberalism. In this way, it will also become clear that recent attempts to qualify Foucault as himself sympathetic to neoliberalism are quite mistaken

## Symposium IV.6

### **Inequality, Democracy and Property: Part One**

*Annelien de Dijn (Utrecht University), Constanze Binder (Erasmus University Rotterdam) and Dick Timmer (Utrecht University)*

A major source of contemporary polarization is the polarization of wealth holdings. The papers in these two panels explore what inequality means for democracy, freedom and the justification of property. The classical conception of a liberal-democratic society depends upon a clear split between the private and the public sphere. Ideally, political institutions protect public interests and private individuals/groups can freely pursue their private interests. However, contemporary interpenetrations of the private and public sphere render this claim hollow. Wealthy individuals and corporations influence politics through means such as selectively funding political parties and organs of public opinion. These panels investigate which normative criteria should be used to evaluate the influence of wealth on democratic institutions. Democratic theories often make idealising egalitarian assumptions, and the transition to non-ideal theory may necessitate re-thinking the foundations of democratic legitimacy and fairness. Even more than these abstract questions, however, we focus on what policies and institutions are required in the light of these reflections. In particular, is it feasible to insulate politics from economic inequality, or is something more radical necessary? Are huge wealth holdings unacceptable as a standing threat to democracy, freedom, and autonomy? If so, what can be done about them? These panels explore various aspects of this under-appreciated political rationale for policies to promote greater economic equality. Beyond this, we also question whether the structure of classical liberal ownership itself needs to be amended to make room for democratic equality. Should shareholders be compelled to share control over firms with their workers? What would the structure of property look like if we paid more attention to the opportunities people actually have rather than formal rights against non-

interference? And finally, if the idea of the public-private divide should be attenuated, should we move away from individualistic, contractarian models of the justification of property itself? This pair of panels will be relevant to all those interested in these topical questions at the intersection of economic justice and democratic theory.

***Contribution 1 Title: Republicanism, Freedom and Social Equality: From Machiavelli to Robespierre***

This paper explores the interrelation between freedom and social equality in the republican tradition from Machiavelli to Robespierre. By exploring the work of thinkers including Machiavelli, Harrington, Noah Webster, Thomas Jefferson and Robespierre, I aim to show that the fostering of social equality was an important goal for early modern republicans. More specifically, I aim to show that they believed that true democracy - and therefore republican freedom - was impossible to maintain in a society characterized by a disparity of wealth. I conclude by reflecting on the value of this much-neglected aspect of early-modern republicanism for contemporary neo-republicanism.

***Contribution 2 Inequality, Freedom and Democracy***

Despite a sharp rise in economic inequality in recent decades, redistribution policies are still heavily disputed. One reason why policies of redistribution are often opposed is that such policies are taken to distort/reduce incentives on free markets. (Increasing) inequality is often taken to be justified as long as it improves the situation of the worst off due to a growth of overall wealth. In this article we shall focus on freedom and inequality and put arguments voiced against redistributive measures under scrutiny. We shall focus in particular on the relationship between inequality and democratic freedoms and identify preliminary conditions under which an increase in inequality can lead or contribute to undermining democratic freedoms. We conclude the paper with a discussion of different policy measures that aim to strengthen democratic freedoms. It is argued that a crucial element of policies aiming to safeguard democratic institutions is to address economic inequality.

***Contribution 3 Title: Political Equality and the Problem of Extreme Wealth***

In this paper I will argue that a concern for political equality gives strong reasons to view extreme wealth as morally objectionable. I will also argue that limitarian policies, which limit the amount of wealth individuals can appropriate (e.g. a high inheritance tax, or maximum income), are a necessary step towards establishing political equality. The argument for extreme wealth as a moral problem runs as follows: political equality requires that nobody should have more or less political influence just because they are richer. However, extreme wealth allows the rich more political influence precisely because they are richer. This means that it

threatens political equality. Therefore, to the extent that limitarianism 3 limits extreme wealth, limitarianism is pro tanto justified as a means to promote political equality. Call this the Democratic Argument. One may counter that the Democratic Argument does not render extreme wealth morally objectionable, but points to a relative concern about inequalities in wealth. In this paper I develop three arguments which show that given current inequalities in the distribution of wealth extreme wealth is itself morally significant. They are developed against the background of the actual distribution of wealth in current liberal democratic societies, rather than from an ideal state in which wealth and political power are strictly distinct. The first argument is the Capital Clustering Argument. Financial capital tends to attract nonfinancial capital, such as knowledge and opportunities ('social capital'), and behavioral norms and dispositions ('cultural capital'). The increasingly substantial differences in access to nonfinancial capital that come with being a member of a specific wealthy social group translates into unjustifiable differences in opportunities to political influence. Limitarian policies target capital clustering and promote political equality by directly targeting the accumulation of wealth. The second objection is that under current non-ideal circumstances extreme wealth itself grants an inordinate amount of power. Call this the Domination Argument. Wealth can be used to encroach on the liberty of others, thereby exercising enormous power over the everyday life of others. In real life, under our present non-ideal circumstances, the purchasing power of the very wealthy ranges over schools, land, houses, factories, companies, hospitals, etc. and through this they gain enormous power over the every-day life of others. And domination in those spheres (e.g. the market sphere) translates into inequalities in opportunity to influence politics. The third argument is the Self-Serving Bias Argument. People tend to be biased towards their own conception of the good and the role they played in their financial success. This self-serving bias is reinforced by extreme wealth, and contributes to polarization on peoples' views about predistribution and redistribution. People are biased against seeing the illegitimacy of being rich and the political influence that comes with it, and the illegitimacy of others having much less of both. The unequal distribution of political influence due to, among other things, extreme wealth, combined with the problem of cognitive biases by those in power, reinforces the claim that extreme wealth threatens political equality.

## Symposium IV.7

### **Regular and Irregular Motions: Normativity in Cavendish's Natural Philosophy**

*Laura Georgescu (RUG), Jonathan Shabean (Uppsala University), and Boris Demarest  
(Heidelberg University)*

This panel addresses the status, place, and source of normativity in the natural

philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. Scholars have recently begun considering how she sought to deal with such questions. Since Cavendish makes at times perplexing and seemingly paradoxical claims about orderly (or regular) and disorderly (or irregular) natural motions, there are a number of underexplored but important exegetical issues we propose to address. For instance, scholars have begun debating whether Cavendish's views on regular and irregular motions commit her to the existence of norms in nature, and whether and how those views can be reconciled with what many take to be her claim that nature as a whole is regular and orderly. On one account, defended by Walters (2014), Cavendish's distinction between regular and irregular motions in Nature does not commit her to normativity in nature. Additionally, Walters argues that both regular and irregular motions are necessary for the overall order of Nature. Cunning (2016), however, allows for a limited sense in which Cavendish would ascribe normativity to Nature. He argues that norms for natural motion are ultimately indexed to our perspective, such that what gets classified as irregular is whatever runs counter to our concerns and our current understanding. Nevertheless, he agrees with Walters that, from the perspective of the whole of Nature, these apparent irregularities are part of a harmoniously ordered structure.

By contrast, Detlefsen (2009) and Boyle (2017) both maintain that irregularities are true disorders in Nature. On this view, finite parts of Nature are supposed to act in accordance with a set of prescribed norms, and it is in relation to such norms that their motions get qualified as regular or irregular. If a motion is "fit" for the norm in place, then it is regular; if it is a violation of the norm, then it is irregular. Because parts of Nature can sometimes err, irregular motions are possible. Given this, Detlefsen and Boyle defend a normative reading of natural motions: error is built into Cavendish's metaphysics, and is not merely indexed to a human standpoint, as in Cunning's interpretation. Rather, God is the source of normativity in Nature. For Detlefsen, God "rationally suggests" norms for parts of nature to follow in order to produce harmonious, orderly motion throughout Nature. For Boyle, God's role is less advisory: God "commands" Nature to behave according to "Natural Rules" for motion.

The papers in this symposium challenge the conceptual frameworks and assumptions that structure this debate on regular and irregular motions in Cavendish's philosophy. In doing so, they shed new light on important problems in the interpretation of Cavendish's philosophy (such as the relationship between nature and its parts, and between nature and God), and clarify the problems of irregularity and normativity and their place in nature.

***Contribution 1: No true disorder, no true order: Regularity and Irregularity in Cavendish's Philosophy of Nature***

This talk contributes to the ongoing debate about normativity and regularity in Cavendish's philosophy by challenging what I take to be a presupposition held by

many involved in the debate: that Nature as a whole is the kind of thing that can be ordered (or disordered). I argue that, in Cavendish's philosophical system, especially as developed in the *Observations upon experimental philosophy* (1666) and the *Grounds of natural philosophy* (1668), it is a category mistake to treat the whole of Nature as regular or irregular. I defend this claim with two arguments. One argument builds on Cavendish's claims about parts and wholes: specifically, I take Cavendish to deny both whole-to-whole interactions and whole-to-part interactions – i.e., wholes qua wholes are by definition non-relational. Regularity and irregularity, though, are relations, and hence can only exist between parts, and cannot be extended to the whole of Nature, given its non-relationality. This is why, strictly speaking, the whole of Nature is not the kind of thing that can be ordered or disordered. The second argument builds on Cavendish's claims about the effects of nature. Everything that could ever possibly be experienced is an effect of natural motions, but Nature as a whole is not *strictu sensu* composed of these effects. Consequently, while they are, in some sense, effects "of" nature, and while we can talk about aggregates of such effects, in doing so, we say nothing about Nature as a whole. In which case, even if we could talk about the order and disorder of the effects of nature, we would still not be saying anything about Nature as a whole. However, all of this does not entail that regularity and irregularity are entirely illusory. From the perspective of the parts of nature, I show that nature's motions have to be both regular and irregular. My claim here takes the form of a conditional: if there is to be the kind of a world in which we encounter particular creatures (finite associations of finite parts enjoying diachronic unity) with ordered behaviour – that is, given the kind of world in which we, and Cavendish, do seem to live – then regular and irregular motions (of parts in relation to other parts) are necessary. Maximum regularity and maximum irregularity simply cannot bring about the kind of world we are familiar with.

### ***Contribution 2: The Source of Normativity in Cavendish's Metaphysics***

Margaret Cavendish held that Nature harmoniously governs the orderly motion of her (Nature's) parts, but she also traced societal and personal ills like war and disease to disorderly or irregular motions in Nature. Fitting these commitments together generates puzzles for Cavendish scholars. One such puzzle concerns the status of normative constraints on what count as orderly or regular motions. In her recent monograph, Deborah Boyle structures that debate as between two camps who differ over whether irregular motions truly violate norms. In this piece, I suggest a re-orientation of the debate, such that what is at issue is not primarily whether norms are truly violated, but the source of such norms. The debate is complicated by Cavendish's claims that disorderly motions are required for the overall harmony of nature. As Cavendish puts it, "opposite" motions ensure that Nature does not "run into extremes" and thereby into "confusion" (e.g., at *Observations upon Experimental Philosophy*, 1.27; 1.31; 1.37, Q6 and Q10; 2.6; 2.20; and 3.4, as well as *Grounds of Natural Philosophy*, 1.14, 2.10 and 3.1). In the

reconstruction I offer, her claims here are intimately related to her argument against the void. She associates the void with parts moving away from the parts that surround them ("dividing," as she puts it) without immediately thereby becoming surrounded by other parts ("composing," as she puts it). She also takes plenism to be a precondition of harmony, and so her argument against the void is, as Karen Detlefsen puts it, a normative argument. But though the avoidance of confusion through the opposite motions of composition and division results in Nature's harmony---a seemingly positive normative status---divisions themselves have a negative normative status. In particular, regularity and order are for Cavendish matters of what I call hypothetical normativity. Hypothetical normativity is, roughly, suitability to the achievement of some end. In Cavendish's panpsychist metaphysics, creatures are understood as societies of finite parts of Nature, unified by mutual passionate love. The typical end of such a society is its own preservation. Since divisions are disunifying motions, they are contrary to societies' typical ends. So divisions are violations of hypothetical normativity, even as they are a necessary ingredient in Nature's overall harmony. Since Cavendish takes order and regularity to be grounded in what I am calling hypothetical normativity, those passages in which Cavendish discusses "proper" or "fitting" motions can easily be accounted for, without joining Boyle in attributing a crucial legislative function to God. Whereas Boyle takes such passages to be evidence for the view that norms are divinely prescribed, I read them as descriptions of how societies should behave if they want to remain together, as I think Cavendish intended. Moreover, the position I take relative to the debate as I re-orient it has the benefit of making Cavendish right about the role of God in her philosophy. She accounts for normativity, as she represents herself doing generally in her philosophy, without invoking God.

### ***Contribution 3: Autonomy and Heteronomy as sources of order and disorder***

In a recent monograph, Deborah Boyle defends the claim that Cavendish held a "true disorders" view according to which nature contains real irregularities and disorders that are violations of natural norms. Boyle argues that Cavendish conceives of irregularities and disorders as behavior initiated by parts of nature that runs counter to the essential nature of said parts, violating the norms God has suggested or decreed for the behavior of parts with that particular nature. Boyle indicates, however, that, except in the case of human beings, Cavendish does not seem to offer a clear explanation of why parts of nature would exhibit such "unnatural" behavior – she merely seems to suggest that parts of nature are capable of doing so because they are free in a libertarian sense. In this paper, I suggest a reading of Cavendish's account of "unnatural", "disorderly" and "irregular" behavior that allows us to understand how such behavior arises. Specifically, I propose the reading that orderly behavior is behavior guided by the ***norms or rules governing the nature of the part of nature initiating the***

*behavior*, whereas disorderly behavior is guided and prompted by the norms or rules foreign to the nature of the part of nature initiating the behavior. In a sense, then, orderly behavior is autonomous, whereas disorderly behavior is heteronomous. On this reading, all behavior of parts of nature is according to some “nature”, and I will argue that this can be important for understanding what Cavendish might mean when she seems to ascribe order and disorder to nature as a whole. Moreover, the reading allows us to relate Cavendish’s account of “nature” and “normativity” to an Aristotelian framework that has similar motivations (e.g. accounting for the behavior of biological entities) and similar implications (e.g. a strong distinction between “natural” and “artificial” that limits the usefulness of experimentation in natural philosophy). Finally, this reading suggests that there are important points of agreement between Cavendish and Van Helmont that are underappreciated when one focuses mainly on her explicit rejection of the latter’s matter theory

## Symposium V.1

### **Ethics of human enhancement: overlooked issues important for policy**

*Stephanie Gauttier (UT), Sean Jensen (UT), Lily E Frank (TUE) and Lesley Ann Daly (University of the Arts London)*

Human enhancement is transitioning from a futuristic possibility to a set of existing interventions that people can and will use. Individuals already have the option to utilize digital technologies for cognitive, psychological, and physical human enhancement. While prominent examples of this kind of use have existed for quite some time, they were restricted to a small group of individuals who label themselves as first-generation cyborgs or post humans. But use of cyborg and enhancement technologies are going mainstream. For instance, companies are beginning to encourage employees to get microchip implants, and some Swedish citizens are installing these implants as a pass for the gym or public transit<sup>1</sup>. While this particular technology has yet to reach the stage of enhancing human capability directly, its development signals a growing interest in engineering oneself and augmenting one’s abilities with technology. Policy-makers have commissioned research to get a deeper understanding of the ethical issues surrounding human enhancement so as to prepare adequate regulatory measures. To be efficient, this should look beyond the themes tackled by policy concerning technologies, which have traditionally been regulated from the point of view of issues that have already arose such as privacy or safety. Motivating this symposium is the idea that philosophers can make an input into the policy debate by bringing forward what is specific to human enhancement technologies and absent from the current rhetoric. We bring different perspectives forward to identify future areas of work and methods to inform policy-making through applied philosophy. Our first speaker

will focus on a dimension of the use of technology rarely considered by asking how to consider the impact of human enhancement onto the meaning attached to our actions. Then, the next speaker will discuss the potential for moral enhancement that technology brings. Issues such as these need to be communicated to the public who will be affected by resulting policies, so they can participate in the debate with a clear understanding. Communicating to the public is an intervention that shapes the way individuals think about human enhancement. Thinking critically of these interventions and finding a way to embed the philosophical issues at stake is also needed. The third speaker will describe her approach to communicating with the public and the ethical issues this raises. The speakers and the audience will then engage in a conversation on how philosophy and ethics can contribute to the practical debate on human enhancement in society and policy circles, and which aspects of the debate on human enhancement need to be pushed forward.

### ***Contribution 1 Human Enhancement Technology & Meaningfulness: A Proof-of-Concept***

Human enhancement, long relegated to a speculative field of what-ifs, is quickly transitioning into an active scientific enterprise yielding new technologies poised to change society in minor and major ways. In order to navigate the emerging changes with ethically positive results, we must know more about what is at stake. Philosophers often discuss the potential for enhancement technologies to affect well-being, or to change human nature. Few, however, have explored the potential for enhancement technologies to affect meaningfulness: how we find it, how we experience it, and how we understand it. My project is focused on analysing how human enhancement technologies may affect meaningfulness in positive and negative ways, as well as how the emerging field may change how we view meaningfulness at a more granular level. My symposium talk will consist of a brief walkthrough of the approach I plan to take in this project, followed by a test case in which I will provide a proof-of-concept analysis of an enhancement technology and discuss how this technology could affect meaningfulness. Using previous research, I will consider how a speculative neuro-implant with the ability to insert advertisements into one's dreams could affect meaningfulness. Pertinent questions include: would the invasion of one's dreams using this technology affect the meaningfulness in one's life? If dreams can play an important role in making a life meaningful, it seems that this technology could impact meaningfulness by altering the authority a user can effectively attribute to what they experience in their dreams. However, if one views dreams as an experience that cannot impact the meaningfulness in an individual's life, then we must look further to know whether such a device would impact meaningfulness. Further, could a commercial neural implant that invades dreams alter modern views of meaningfulness? If such a technology becomes widespread, a society of users may embrace losing the subconscious authority inherent in uninvaded dreams in favour of the convenience

of receiving potentially useful information even whilst asleep. Although I would expect most modern persons would find this notion disturbing, one could argue that minor erosions of the kind are taking place as mobile and internet technologies alter the way we communicate, connect and interact with others. It seems that many are comfortable with the subtle changes occurring due to such technologies. By investigating how our understanding of meaningfulness is changing we can take a deeper look at whether or not we should embrace the unimpeded development of such technologies.

***Contribution 2: Wearable and implantable moral technologies as a form of moral enhancement: what are the risks?***

Moral bioenhancement, nudge-designed environments, and ambient persuasive technologies may help us behave more consistently with deeply held moral convictions. Alternatively, they may aid us in overcoming cognitive and affective limitations that prevent us from appreciating a situation's moral dimensions. Or they may simply make it easier for us to make the morally right choice, helping us to overcome sources of weakness of will. In this paper I make two assumptions. First, technologies to improve our moral capacities are realizable. Second, such technologies will actually help us get morality right and behave more consistently with whatever the 'real' right thing to do turns out to be. I then consider whether or not we lose anything valuable, particularly opportunities for moral progress, when we make being moral much easier, eliminating difficult moral deliberation and internal moral struggle. I ultimately reject the worry that moral struggle has value as a catalyst for moral progress, understood here as the discovery and application of new values or sensitization to new sources of harm.

***Contribution 3: Critical Design exploration of the impact of Human Enhancement***

Currently categorised as non-medical, many Human Enhancement (HE) devices do not legally have to conform to regulations that medical devices must. Therefore, HE products go to market without the manufacturer having much practical knowledge of the use and affects, and without regulated testing. HE policy recommendation documents raise issues such as: therapy vs enhancement; accessibility; lack of regulation; and morphological freedom. Through reading these documents they all advocate bringing the public into the discussion as they are who will be affected by the development and widespread implementation of the technology. However, as such dense documents, it is hard to see how the public will be able to understand and meaningfully engage with the issues they raise. Which led me to question: 'How can Critical Design methodologies be used to examine the impact of Human Enhancement, and assess ethical issues related to the design and use of the technology?' Critical Design methodologies are utilized to interrogate issues of technological impact and critique emerging technologies. By critically analysing the social, political and ethical contexts of devices, along

with their functional and aesthetic design, informed futures scenarios can be modelled in material and experiential form. These creative provocations about pragmatic and ethical factors affecting HE users, raise important questions about the trajectory of the technology, and the industrial context that cultivated it. By deconstructing and mapping provoking topics within policy recommendation documents this project aims to create an experiential design piece. This piece will allow the public to obtain greater understanding of the field HE and its potential positive and negative consequences, allowing them to contribute to the conversation.

## Symposium V.4

### **Hermeneutics: Analytical and Continental Prospects**

*Wouter Bisschop (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Marcus Duwell, (Utrecht University) Sanem Yazicioglu (Tilburg University) and Gert-Jan Van der Heiden (Radboud University)*

Contemporary hermeneutics exhibits a very disunited and confused picture. What in the past referred to the method or theory of text interpretation comes these days with a wide variety of very different adjectives—‘theological’, ‘philosophical’, ‘narrative’, ‘interreligious’, ‘radical’, ‘ecological’, ‘naturalistic’, ‘transcendentalist’, ‘Japanese’—and can have, besides texts, very diverse objects: installation art, religious education, the imagination, the film world, hell, action, to name a few. The meaning of ‘hermeneutics’ in these uses often remains rather unclear. Most introductory texts to the field of hermeneutics are very not helpful either. Depending on era and author, ‘hermeneutics’ is used to refer to the methodology, science, art, or rules of interpretation (e.g. Chladenius), to the theory of interpretation or understanding (e.g. Schleiermacher), to reflection on understanding as “die Seinsweise des Daseins selber” (Heidegger, Gadamer), to a particular approach to philosophy or literary studies, analogous to e.g. (post-)structuralism, deconstruction, constructivism, or to a set of philosophical doctrines, e.g. about the historicity of our being and understanding (e.g. Gadamer).

Do these different notions have something in common, or is it, ultimately, merely a historical accident that all these different projects get called by the same name? And what are the future prospects of this apparently divided field? This symposium aims to facilitate a conversation on the nature of hermeneutics between proponents of different philosophical approaches. Apart from contributing to a deeper understanding of the field and the identification of future projects, the symposium also aims to reflect on the remarkable absence of hermeneutical issues on the agenda of so-called ‘analytical philosophy’. Is hermeneutics inherently non-analytical, or is there room for something like an ‘analytical hermeneutics’?

Among the specific problems on which this symposium invites reflection are the

following. First, how do the different historical notions of ‘hermeneutics’ relate to each other? Almost every introductory text on hermeneutics consists of a historical overview that describes views as diverse as those of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Hans-Georg Gadamer on understanding. Should we think of the youngest as continuations of the elder approaches, as them being phases in a historical development? Or does diversity—whether acknowledged or not—dominate historical continuity in such historical overviews? Second, is ‘hermeneutics’ a discipline at all, or should we rather think of it as a philosophical position, as nominalism is in metaphysics, or reliabilism in contemporary analytical epistemology? Third, how does hermeneutics relate to other philosophical subdisciplines? Is it part of metaphysics, or epistemology, is it rather a discipline of its own, or is it a philosophical view with implications for particular subdisciplines in philosophy? Fourth, what’s left of the Wilhelm’s Dilthey’s idea of hermeneutics as the philosophy of the humanities? Is hermeneutics for the humanities what the philosophy of science is for science? Fifth, is hermeneutics an inherently ‘continental’ endeavour, or is an ‘analytical hermeneutics’ possible? The symposium will be successful if it fosters an encounter between continental and analytical styles of philosophizing, and leaves us with a firmer grasp of the variety of hermeneutics and, perhaps, a sense of its unity.

### ***Contribution 1 Hermeneutics and Analytical Epistemology***

Analytical philosophers spent little time on hermeneutical problems. Part of the explanation could be that there is significant confusion and disagreement as to what counts as a ‘hermeneutical problem’. In this paper I try to identify the various kinds of projects that have been labelled ‘hermeneutical’, consider how they relate to each other, and address the question as to how this cluster of problems relates to analytic epistemology. In this way, I hope to provide a way to understand the relations between the great diversity of the projects we find in the history of hermeneutics, and to indicate the projects with which analytical philosophers could engage. There are at least four kinds of questions or projects recognizable in the history of hermeneutics, and in the first part of my paper I aim to describe each of them. In particular the latter three are arguably ‘hermeneutical’ in nature. First, there are epistemic questions: What does something x mean? Second, the methodological questions: How are we to answer the epistemic question? Third, the epistemological questions, such as: When have we obtained knowledge of the meaning of x? And fourth, a number meta-epistemological questions, such as ‘how is understanding at all possible?’, ‘What is it to think?’ The second part of my paper aims to examine the relations between these four projects, and their relation to the field of analytical epistemology. The latter three kinds of questions I identified are questions at successive ‘levels’ of reflection. This ‘level approach’ in describing the projects with which hermeneutics has been concerned enables us to see how the radically different projects of what is often called ‘traditional hermeneutics’ and Gadamer’s ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ relate to each other.

Moreover, it can be argued that in all four projects reasonable and important questions are raised; there is no reason to think that one of the projects is 'outdated' or superseded by a more recent project. Third, there is no principled reason to think that the hermeneutical projects I distinguished suit so-called 'continental' philosophers better than their 'analytical' colleagues. In fact, I'll argue that a significant part of what gets called 'hermeneutics' concerns varieties of the issues with which analytical epistemology is concerned (the epistemological problems), or applied thereof (the methodological questions). Other parts of it belong to ontology, logic, or some other philosophical discipline (some of the meta-epistemological problems). I propose, then, to think of hermeneutics as a part of epistemology or meta-epistemology.

### ***Contribution 2: Is There a Future for Hermeneutics?***

Thinking about the role of hermeneutics is important for current philosophical discourses for various reasons. For one, hermeneutics is at the centre of the divide between continental and analytic philosophy. Moreover, hermeneutics is the most paradigmatic endeavour to secure a particular role for the humanities. That means that the discussion about the topic is much more important than only a reflection of a specific branch of philosophy. This paper will explore a possible profile of philosophical hermeneutics along a historical and a systematic line and will conclude with some suggestions as to its future prospects. The mainstream discourse assumes that only the Heidegger-Gadamer tradition of hermeneutics was really able to develop hermeneutics as a philosophical discipline. The judgments of Gadamer about Kant, Schleiermacher and Dilthey were decisive for the dominant view on the nature of hermeneutics. A necessary prerequisite for a future discourse on hermeneutics seems to be a critical revision of this view. This is not to say that I think one can directly continue the philosophical endeavours of Schleiermacher or Dilthey, but a critical reconstruction of the early routes of hermeneutics helps to explore the various possible roles for a future hermeneutics. Rudolf Makkreel offers a fruitful reconstruction of a line from Kant's third Critique to Dilthey's hermeneutics as a model for the humanities. Kant-scholars like Held, Herman, Longuenesse, O'Neill or Waxman have emphasized the vital role of judgment and 3 understanding for the critical project. I shall explore how hermeneutic approaches that emphasize the linguistic and cultural embedding of the interpreting subject allow for critical philosophy. In this way, Makkreel and others may help us to overcome the problematic oppositions in the historiography of hermeneutics introduced by Gadamer. The assumption is that such a revision makes room to see hermeneutics not just as a technique of interpretation or as an overarching approach to philosophy, but to emphasize that philosophical reflection on the praxis of understanding is important for all other philosophical disciplines. This approach to hermeneutics will be discussed with reference to its relationship to ethics and morality. The guiding assumption is that a promising route to the understanding and justification of morality would locate moral commitments in

the consistent self-understanding of agents, a view that sometimes is referred to as Kantian constructivism. For such a route to ethics, it is important to understand the relationship between the hermeneutical view on understanding and the basis of normativity. This connection has been underdeveloped in current debate because the Heidegger-Gadamer-tradition shows some hostility to normative reflexion in the first place, while mainstream analytic philosophers often cherish their allergic reactions to the hermeneutic tradition. The above-mentioned exploration of alternative routes to hermeneutics may be helpful to overcome those unproductive deadlocks. The paper will conclude with some suggestions for further debates in hermeneutics.

### ***Contribution 3 Encountering the World: Perception, Apprehension, Interpretation***

This contribution investigates how to extend the sense of hermeneutics along the lines of the reflective judgment in Kant and the notion of intersubjectivity in Husserl's phenomenology. In *The Poetics of Space*, Bachelard writes, "when the image is new, the world is new." (1994, 47.) Yet, how does the world become new to us and can we share this new world(s) with the others? These questions are of pivotal importance to understand what hermeneutics can mean today from a phenomenological perspective. The world and the image have a particular importance in Husserl's phenomenology: the primary task of the philosopher, as Husserl says, is to constitute the world as *eidos*; only this task can found philosophy as a rigorous science. The world should be constituted as *eidos*, because our perception of the reality of the world operates in two ways: (i) our perception of the world changes due to changing perspectives, and (ii) our apprehension of these perceptions are fundamentally interpretative. This sense of the *eidos* points to a similarity between Husserl and Kant because both aim to give another meaning to the word *eidos* or *Idea* than Plato did. For both Husserl and Kant, *eidos* or *Idea* signifies a unity in the manifoldness of perceptions and their apprehensions; this unity renders them communicable. In establishing this unity, the function of Kant's distinction between determinate and reflective judgments is comparable to the function of Husserl's distinction between judgments that are based on determinate and indeterminate perceptions of reality. Reflective judgments and indeterminate perceptions are not only interpretative, but they are hermeneutical because they enable intersubjective communication. To elaborate these points, I will first discuss the relation between the interpretative character of apprehension and its transposition into a judgment and, second why this transposition is inevitably hermeneutical. To demonstrate the former, I will compare the reflective judgments to the judgments based on indeterminate reality, and to demonstrate the latter, I will compare Kant's maxim of "enlarged thought" to Husserl's intersubjectivity. These analyses expose how transcendental philosophy offers a wider conception of hermeneutics: "It is transcendental, not in the sense providing building blocks of truth, but in the sense of opening up the reflective

horizon of communal meaning in terms of which the truth can be determined.” (Makkreel, 1990, 158.) Paper Abstract 4 What is the Relevance of Hermeneutics Today? While attention to interpretation and the art of interpreting correctly goes back to ancient times, the philosophical attention to hermeneutics has a genuinely modern flavor; it “bears the signature of modernity”, as Jean Grondin suggests. In order to answer the question of what the relevance of hermeneutics today is, it is important to address the basic elements of the modern philosophical enterprise that have been formative of hermeneutics and philosophical hermeneutics and to ask what the remaining or renewed importance of these elements is. In the first part of this paper, I will discuss the following, closely related elements that determine or drive the specific epistemological enterprise of hermeneutics. One should think here of (1) the finitude and historical—linguistic, cultural—nature of the human being and of human understanding, which leads in hermeneutics to the concepts of horizon or perspective/perspectivity; (2) the importance of the notion of life (starting from Kant’s use of it in the third critique, up to Dilthey and Nietzsche) as a category that seems to point to both the source and the goal of human understanding, which can never fully be recuperated by reason and understanding (in this sense, the relation between life and understanding stipulates the finitude of, e.g., human self-understanding and determines it as a hermeneutic process); (3) the dimension of plurality, which is an important element if one wants to understand why, strictly speaking, hermeneutics cannot favour either the first person perspective or the third person perspective, but has an intrinsic emphasis on the second person or social perspective; moreover, this plural perspective has inspired both the more “peaceful” hermeneutical models of Gadamer’s dialogue and the more “combatant” models of interpretation that we find in Nietzsche, giving also rise to what Ricoeur called the “conflict of interpretations.” In the second part of this paper, if time permits, I want to investigate in which sense exactly these three elements are crucial to understand why hermeneutics is an indispensable epistemological tool in the realism debates that are nowadays appearing on the crossroads of analytical and continental philosophy (e.g. in Gabriel, Ferraris, Benoit, and Harman).

## Posters in Alphabetical Order

### **The ethics of using big data for biomedical research: a case study**

*Marieke Bak (Amsterdam AMC)*

The use of big data for biomedical research brings about ethical dilemmas regarding the balance between participants' rights and the societal value of research. Implementation of new European data protection legislation has focused our attention on privacy concerns, arising from the large-scale use and linkage of these sensitive personal data. However, moral reflection should include broader individual- and group-level harms, and include discussions on the respective importance of values like autonomy and solidarity. This poster presents a case study among researchers collecting big data in a particularly challenging context: medical emergency settings where participants cannot give prospective informed consent.

### **When Success Becomes the New Normal: The Competitive Society and its Symptoms**

*Yvette Drissen (Tilburg University)*

Introduction: There has been an alarming increase in the number of people with stress related mental disorders over the last decades. One hypothetical explanation is that people in general, and workers more specifically, internalize societal ideas in which competition and success are focused on and narrowed to rising on the hierarchical and salary ladder.

Part 1: How and to what extent can mental health problems such as burnout be understood as symptoms of underlying social discourses?

Part 2: How can workers' value perspective be broadened, in order to prevent mental health problems and enhancing the quality of life?

### **From deproductive democracy to reproductive democratization**

*Anna Hollendung (Kiel University & Bremen University)*

Do democracies take a convincing account of the demands of reproductive work and the needs of future generations? How can existing systems, for which I propose the neologism of the deproductive democracies, be supplemented in such a way that they correspond to a positive draft in which the democratic potential would be unfolded in favour of future generations? I describe forms of political

action in which sustainability and democracy are simultaneously realized (not in the form of a "expertocracy of sustainability" or a contemporary-oriented democracy), as elements of reproductive democratization.

## **Soft Edges of Hardcore Technology**

*Petko Karadechev, Anja Jacobsen, Anna Hansen, Corinna Voll, and Monika Banytė (Aalborg University at Aarhus)*

This project will create a techno-anthropological research approach meant to be applied to concepts within bioethics and investigate their interactions with emergent values addressing “The Good Life” in a present hyper-technologized world setting. An approach that would open up to questions like: How does a socio-technical focus on risk and prevention affect the perception of “The Good Life”? What is an (un)healthy body? What role does the right not to know play in today’s society? The approach will deal with keywords such as risk, autonomy, values and standardization of health. A collection of cases will illustrate the approach.

## **Defining 'Social Evidence'**

*Dimitri van Capelleveen (Vrij University Amsterdam)*

An important concept for certain subfields of social epistemology, is that of 'social evidence.' Although several rough descriptions of this concept have been given, and there are some standard examples of pieces of social evidence (e.g. testimony), no formal definition has been offered yet. My aim, then, is to propose such a definition, one that, I argue, captures all, and only, pieces of evidence which can be considered ‘social.’ The hope is that this can be a useful contribution to the growing, and important, field of social epistemology.

## **Representing future generations in international climate law-making: fairness, legitimacy and effectiveness**

*Nicky van Dijk (Utrecht University)*

Current international treaties concerning climate change often implicitly or explicitly include the believed needs of future generations, but the fairness and effectiveness of the current take is disputed by many. As a way to address this deficit, several proposals for the representation of future generations by proxy have been made, but these proposals face immense democratic costs. This research focuses on whether, to what extent and how the needs of future generations should be fairly considered in international climate law-making through proxy-style representative institutions, aiming at fairness, legitimacy and effectiveness.