Morality, psychopathy, and rational agency

Monday, June 3, 2013
Leiden University
Lipsius Building, room 235 C.
Cleveringaplaats 1
2311 BD Leiden

13:00 – 14:30:
Discussion of:
Marijana Milosavljevic-Vujosevic (University of Groningen)
“Conscience and Psychopathic Moral Incompetence”
Comments by Hanno Sauer (Leiden University/University of Groningen)

15:00 (sharp; ‘klokke drie uur’) – 17:00:
Lecture:
Jeanette Kennett (Macquarie University)
“What is required for motivation by principle?”
Comments by Frank Hindriks (University of Groningen)

17:00-18:00
Drinks

Attendance is free and open to all. If you would like to attend the first session, please register by sending an email message to pauline.kleingeld@rug.nl. You will receive Marijana Milosavljevic-Vujosevic’s paper a week before the meeting.

This workshop is funded by the NWO program, “Morality beyond illusions: Re-assessing the philosophical implications of empirical studies of moral agency”, Prof. Pauline Kleingeld (University of Groningen).

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Abstracts:
Kennett, “What is required for motivation by principle?”

Kant claimed both that “moral feeling is the capacity to be affected by a moral judgment” and that moral motivation is motivation by principle. What is the psychological mechanism or mechanisms which could enable principles to motivate?  In this paper I will develop in more detail a suggestion I’ve made elsewhere that posits a connection between susceptibility to cognitive dissonance and moral motivation of a broadly Kantian kind. The account I offer will allow us to better understand our successes in conforming our actions to our values, the processes of value revision, and the all too common ways in which we defeat our own values.  It also provides an explanation of the failures of moral motivation in psychopaths that differs from the usual focus on their callousness and lack of empathy.  In essence it argues that the kind of moral motivation that Kant is talking about is constitutively connected to our status as diachronic selves and our rational agentive capacities.

Milosavljevic-Vujosevic, “Conscience and Psychopathic Moral Incompetence”

In order to examine whether moral flaws of psychopaths are traceable to their dysfunctional conscience, I have analysed different models for understanding conscience. If read as the reflective capacity for moral self-assessment that triggers certain emotional reactions, conscience proves to be a fruitful tool for explaining psychopathic moral incompetence. Severely underdeveloped self-evaluative capacity profoundly affects psychopath’s competence in judging moral issues and in being motivated to act morally. By addressing the poor moral self-appraisal exhibited by psychopaths, I pinpoint the link between their morally relevant rational and affective shortcomings.  I then indicate how this link can explain the relation between some of the key symptoms of psychopathy. Finally, I highlight how focusing on this specific rational deficit modifies the status of rationalism within the contemporary dispute as to whether psychopathy presents a case in favor of sentimentalism.